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Abstract. Analysis of a probabilistic system often requires to learn the joint probability distribution of its random
variables. The computation of the exact distribution is usually an exhaustive precise analysis on all executions of the
system. To avoid the high computational cost of such an exhaustive search, statistical analysis has been studied to
efficiently obtain approximate estimates by analyzing only a small but representative subset of the system’s behavior. In
this paper we propose a hybrid statistical estimation method that combines precise and statistical analyses to estimate
mutual information, Shannon entropy, and conditional entropy, together with their confidence intervals. We show how
to combine the analyses on different components of a discrete system with different accuracy to obtain an estimate for
the whole system. The new method performs weighted statistical analysis with different sample sizes over different
components and dynamically finds their optimal sample sizes. Moreover, it can reduce sample sizes by using prior
knowledge about systems and a new abstraction-then-sampling technique based on qualitative analysis. To apply the
method to the source code of a system, we show how to decompose the code into components and to determine the
analysis method for each component by overviewing the implementation of those techniques in the HyLeak tool. We
demonstrate with case studies that the new method outperforms the state of the art in quantifying information leakage.
Keywords: Mutual information; Statistical estimation; Quantitative information flow; Hybrid method; Confidence
interval; Statistical model checking
1. Introduction
In modeling and analyzing software and hardware systems, the statistical approach is often useful to evaluate quantitative
aspects of the behaviors of the systems. In particular, probabilistic systems with complicated internal structures can be
approximately and efficiently modeled and analyzed. For instance, statistical model checking has widely been used to
verify quantitative properties of many kinds of probabilistic systems [LDB10].
The statistical analysis of a probabilistic system is usually considered as a black-box testing approach in which the
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(a) A probabilistic program composed of 3 components.
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(b) Joint distribution PXY composed of 3 components.
Fig. 1. Decomposition of a probabilistic program with input x ∈ {x1, x2, x3, x4} and output y ∈ {y1, y2, y3, y4} into
components S1, S2, and T for compositional analysis. These components have a probability of being visited of 0.25,
0.4, and 0.35 respectively, accounting for both input distribution and internal randomness. Each component can be
visited on specific inputs, and probabilistically produces an output according to the input value. For instance, the
component S2 is chosen with the probability 0.4 and given input x1, it outputs y3 or y4 with the equal probability 0.5.
The division into components can be used to compositionally produce a joint distribution PXY on the input-output
behavior of the program.
analyst does not require prior knowledge of the internal structure of the system. The analyst runs the system many times
and records the execution traces to construct an approximate model of the system. Even when the formal specification
or precise model of the system is not provided to the analyst, statistical analysis can be directly applied to the system if
the analyst can execute the black-box implementation. Due to this random sampling of the systems, statistical analysis
provides only approximate estimates. However, it can evaluate the precision and accuracy of the analysis for instance
by providing the confidence intervals of the estimated values.
One of the important challenges in statistical analysis is to estimate entropy-based properties in probabilistic systems.
For example, statistical methods [CCG10, CKN13, CKNP13, CKN14, BP14] have been studied for quantitative
information flow analysis [CHM01, KB07, Mal07, CPP08], which estimates an entropy-based property to quantify the
leakage of confidential information in a system. More specifically, the analysis estimates mutual information or other
properties between two random variables on the secrets and on the observable outputs in the system to measure the
amount of information that is inferable about the secret by observing the output. The main technical difficulties in the
estimation of entropy-based properties are:
1. to efficiently compute large matrices that represent probability distributions, and
2. to provide a statistical method for correcting the bias of the estimate and computing a confidence interval to evaluate
the accuracy of the estimation.
To overcome these difficulties, we propose a method for statistically estimating mutual information, one of the
most popular entropy-based properties, in discrete systems. The new method, called hybrid statistical estimation
method, integrates black-box statistical analysis and white-box precise analysis, exploiting the advantages of both.
More specifically, this method employs some prior knowledge on the system and performs precise analysis (e.g., static
analysis of the source code or specification) on some components of the system. Since precise analysis computes the
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exact sub-probability distributions of the components, the hybrid method using precise analysis is more accurate than
statistical analysis alone.
Moreover, the new method can combine multiple statistical analyses on different components of the system to
improve the accuracy and efficiency of the estimation. This is based on our new theoretical results that extend and
generalize previous work [Mod89, Bri04, CCG10] on purely statistical estimation. As far as we know this is the first
work on a hybrid method for estimating entropy-based properties and their confidence intervals. Note that our approach
assumes that the system has discrete inputs and outputs and behaves deterministically or probabilistically, while it can
also be applied to non-deterministic systems if the non-determinism has been resolved by schedulers.
To illustrate the method we propose, Fig. 1 presents an example of a probabilistic program (Fig. 1a) having input
ranging over X = {x1, x2, x3, x4} and output over Y = {y1, y2, y3, y4}, built up from three overlapping components
S1, S2 and T , and the corresponding joint probability distribution PXY (Fig. 1b). To estimate the full joint distribution
PXY , the analyst separately computes the joint sub-distribution for the component T by precise analysis, estimates
those for S1 and S2 by statistical analysis, and then combines these sub-distributions. Since the statistical analysis is
based on the random sampling of execution traces, the empirical sub-distributions for S1 and S2 are different from the
true ones, while the sub-distribution for T is exact. From these approximate and precise sub-distributions, the proposed
method can estimate the mutual information for the entire system and evaluate its accuracy by providing a confidence
interval. Owing to the combination of different kinds of analyses (with possibly different parameters such as sample
sizes), the computation of the bias and confidence interval of the estimate is more complicated than the previous work
on statistical analysis.
1.1. Contributions
The contributions of this paper are as follows:
• We propose a new method, called hybrid statistical estimation, that combines statistical and precise analysis on
the estimation of mutual information (which can also be applied to Shannon entropy and conditional Shannon
entropy). Specifically, we show theoretical results on compositionally computing the bias and confidence interval of
the estimate from multiple results obtained by statistical and precise analysis;
• We present a weighted statistical analysis method with different sample sizes over different components and a
method for adaptively optimizing the sample sizes by evaluating the accuracy and cost of the analysis;
• We show how to reduce the sample sizes by using prior knowledge about systems, including an abstraction-then-
sampling technique based on qualitative analysis. In particular, we point out that the state-of-the-art statistical
analysis tool LeakWatch [CKN14] incorrectly computes the bias in estimation using the knowledge of the prior
distribution, and explain how the proposed approach fixes this problem;
• We show that the proposed method can be applied not only to composed systems but also to the source codes of a
single system by decomposing it into components and determining the analysis method for each component;
• We provide a practical implementation of the method in the HyLeak tool [BKLT], and show how the techniques in
this paper can be applied to multiple benchmarks;
• We evaluate the quality of the estimation in this method, showing that the estimates are more accurate than statistical
analysis alone for the same sample size, and that the new method outperforms the state-of-the-art statistical analysis
tool LeakWatch;
• We demonstrate the effectiveness of the hybrid method in case studies on the quantification of information leakage.
A preliminary version of this paper, without proofs, appeared in [KBL16]. Also a preliminary version of the imple-
mentation description (Sections 7 and 8.2.1), without details, appeared in the tool paper describing HyLeak [BKLT17].
In this paper we add the estimation of Shannon entropy (Propositions 4.3, 4.4 and 6.2) and that of conditional entropy
(Propositions 5.4 and 5.5). We also show the formulas for the adaptive analysis using knowledge of prior distributions
(Proposition 6.3) and using the abstraction-then-sampling technique (Theorem 6.4). Furthermore, we provide detailed
explanation on the implementation in the HyLeak tool in Section 7, including how to decompose the source code
of a system into components. We also present more experimental results with details in Section 8.2. Finally, we add
Appendix A to present the detailed proofs.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces background in quantification of information
and compares precise analysis with statistical analysis for the estimation of mutual information. Section 3 overviews
our new method for estimating mutual information. Section 4 describes the main results of this paper: the statistical
estimation of mutual information for the hybrid method, including the method for optimizing sample sizes for different
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components. Section 5 presents how to reduce sample sizes by using prior knowledge about systems, including the
abstraction-then-sampling technique with qualitative analysis. Section 6 shows the optimal assignment of samples to
components to be samples statistically to improve the accuracy of the estimate. Section 7 overviews the implementation
of the techniques in the HyLeak tool, including how to decompose the source code of a system into components and
to determine the analysis method for each component. Section 8 evaluates the proposed method and illustrates its
effectiveness against the state of the art, and Section 9 concludes the paper. Detailed proofs can be found in Appendix A.
1.2. Related Work
The information-theoretical approach to program security dates back to the work of Denning [Den76] and Gray
[III91]. Clark et al. [CHM01, CHM07] presented techniques to automatically compute mutual information of an
imperative language with loops. For a deterministic program, leakage can be computed from the equivalence relations
on the secret induced by the possible outputs, and such relations can be automatically quantified [BKR09]. Under-
and over-approximation of leakage based on the observation of some traces have been studied for deterministic
programs [ME08, NMS09]. As an approach without replying on information theory McCamant et al. [KMPS11]
developed tools implementing dynamic quantitative taint analysis techniques for security.
Fremont and Seshia [FS14] present a polynomial time algorithm to approximate the weight of traces of deterministic
programs with possible application to quantitative information leakage. Progress in randomized program analysis
includes a scalable algorithm for uniform generation of sample from a distribution defined as constraints [CFM+15,
CMV13], with applications to constrained-random program verification.
The statistical approach to quantifying information leakage has been studied since the seminal work by Chatzikoko-
lakis et al. [CCG10]. Chothia et al. have developed this approach in tools leakiEst [CKN13, CKNa] and LeakWatch [CKN14,
CKNb]. The hybrid statistical method in this paper can be considered as their extension with the inclusion of component
weighting and adaptive priors inspired by the importance sampling in statistical model checking [BHP12, CZ11]. To the
best of our knowledge, no prior work has applied weighted statistical analysis to the estimation of mutual information
or any other leakage measures.
The idea on combining static and randomized approaches to quantitative information flow was first proposed
by Köpf and Rybalchenko [KR10] while our approach takes a different approach relying on statistical estimation
to have better precision and accuracy and is general enough to deal with probabilistic systems under various prior
information conditions. In related fields, the hybrid approach combining precise and statistical analysis have been
proven to be effective, for instance in concolic analysis [MS07, LCFS14], where it is shown that input generated by
hybrid techniques leads to greater code coverage than input generated by both fully random and concolic generation.
After the publication of the preliminary version [KBL16] of this paper, a few papers on quantitative information flow
combining symbolic and statistical approaches have been published. Malacaria et al. [MKP+18] present an approach
that performs Monte Carlo sampling over symbolic paths while the prior distributions are restricted to be uniform.
Sweet et al. [STS+18] combine abstraction interpretation with sampling and concolic execution for reasoning about
Bayes vulnerability. Unlike our work, these two studies aim at giving only bounds on information leakage and do not
use statistical hypothesis testing.
Our tool HyLeak processes a simple imperative language that is an extension of the language used in the QUAIL
tool version 2.0 [BLQ15]. The algorithms for precise computation of information leakage used in this paper are based
on trace analysis [BLMW15], implemented in the QUAIL tool [BLTW, BLTW13, BLQ15]. As remarked above, the
QUAIL tool implements only a precise calculation of leakage that examines all executions of programs. Hence the
performance of QUAIL does not scale, especially when the program performs complicated computations that yield a
large number of execution traces. The performance of QUAIL as compared to HyLeak is represented by the “precise”
analysis approach in Section 8. Since QUAIL does not support the statistical approach or the hybrid approach, it cannot
handle large problems that HyLeak can analyze.
As remarked above, the stochastic simulation techniques implemented in HyLeak have also been developed in the
tools LeakiEst [CKN13] (with its extension [KCP14]) and LeakWatch [CKNP13, CKN14]. The performance of these
tools as compared to HyLeak is represented by the “statistical” analysis approach in Section 8.
The tool Moped-QLeak [CMS14] computes the precise information leakage of a program by transforming it into an
algebraic decision diagram (ADD). As noted in [BLQ15], this technique is efficient when the program under analysis is
simple enough to be converted into an ADD, and fails otherwise even when other tools including HyLeak can handle
it. In particular, there are simple examples [BLQ15] where Moped-QLeak fails to produce any result but that can be
examined by QUAIL and LeakWatch, hence by HyLeak.
Many information leakage analysis tools restricted to deterministic input programs have been released, including
Formal Aspects of Computing 5
TEMU [NMS09], squifc [PM14], jpf-qif [PMTP12], QILURA [PMPd14], nsqflow [VEB+16], and SHARPPI [Wei16].
Some of these tools have been proven to scale to programs of thousands of lines written in common languages like C
and Java. Such tools are not able to compute the Shannon leakage for the scenario of adaptive attacks but only compute
the min-capacity of a deterministic program for the scenario of one-try guessing attacks, which give only a coarse upper
bound on the Shannon leakage. More specifically, they compute the logarithm of the number of possible outputs of
the deterministic program, usually by using model counting on a SMT-constraint-based representation of the possible
outputs, obtained by analyzing the program. Contrary to these tools, HyLeak can analyze randomized programs1 and
provides a quite precise estimation of the Shannon leakage of the program, not just a coarse upper bound. As far as we
know, HyLeak is the most efficient tool that has this greater scope and higher accuracy.
2. Background
In this section we introduce the basic concepts used in the paper. We first introduce some notions in information
theory to quantify the amount of some information in probabilistic systems. Then we compare two previous analysis
approaches to quantifying information: precise analysis and statistical analysis.
2.1. Quantification of Information
In this section we introduce some background on information theory, which we use to quantify the amount of information
in a probabilistic system. Hereafter we write X and Y to denote two random variables, and X and Y to denote the
sets of all possible values of X and Y , respectively. We denote the number of elements of a set A by #A. Given
a random variable A we denote by E[A] or by A the expected value of A, and by V[A] the variance of A, i.e.,
V[A] = E
[
(A− E[A])2]. The logarithms in this paper are to the base 2 and we often abbreviate log2 to log.
2.1.1. Channels
In information theory, a channel models the input-output relation of a system as a conditional probability distribution
of outputs given inputs. This model has also been used to formalize information leakage in a system that processes
confidential data: inputs and outputs of a channel are respectively regarded as secrets and observables in the system and
the channel represents relationships between the secrets and observables.
A discrete channel is a triple (X ,Y, C) where X and Y are two finite sets of discrete input and output values
respectively and C is an #X ×#Y matrix where each element C[x, y] represents the conditional probability of an
output y given an input x; i.e., for each x ∈ X , ∑y∈Y C[x, y] = 1 and 0 ≤ C[x, y] ≤ 1 for all y ∈ Y .
A prior is a probability distribution on input values X . Given a prior PX over X and a channel C from X to Y , the
joint probability distribution PXY of X and Y is defined by: PXY [x, y] = PX [x]C[x, y] for each x ∈ X and y ∈ Y .
2.1.2. Shannon Entropy
We recall some information-theoretic measures as follows. Given a prior PX on input X , the prior uncertainty (before
observing the system’s output Y ) is defined as
H(X) = −
∑
x∈X
PX [x] log2 PX [x]
while the posterior uncertainty (after observing the system’s output Y ) is defined as
H(X|Y ) = −
∑
y∈Y+
PY [y]
∑
x∈X
PX|Y [x|y] log2 PX|Y [x|y],
1 Some of these tools, like jpf-qif and nsqflow, present case studies on randomized protocols. However, the randomness of the programs is assumed
to have the most leaking behavior. E.g., in the Dining Cryptographers this means assuming all coins produce head with probability 1.
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where PY is the probability distribution on the output Y , Y+ is the set of outputs in Y with non-zero probabilities, and
PX|Y is the conditional probability distribution of X given Y :
PY [y] =
∑
x′∈X
PXY [x
′, y] PX|Y [x|y] = PXY [x, y]
PY [y]
if PY [y] 6= 0.
H(X|Y ) is also called the conditional entropy of X given Y .
2.1.3. Mutual Information
The amount of information gained about a random variable X by knowing a random variable Y is defined as the
difference between the uncertainty about X before and after observing Y . The mutual information I(X;Y ) between X
and Y is one of the most popular measures to quantify the amount of information on X gained by Y :
I(X;Y ) =
∑
x∈X ,y∈Y
PXY [x, y] log2
(
PXY [x, y]
PX [x]PY [y]
)
where PY is the marginal probability distribution defined as PY [y] =
∑
x∈X PXY [x, y].
In the security scenario, information-theoretical measures quantify the amount of secret information leaked against
some particular attacker: the mutual information between two random variables X on the secrets and Y on the
observables in a system measures the information that is inferable about the secret by knowing the observable. In this
scenario mutual information, or Shannon leakage, assumes an attacker that can ask binary questions on the secret’s
value after observing the system while min-entropy leakage [Smi09] considers an attacker that has only one attempt to
guess the secret’s value.
Mutual information has been employed in many other applications including Bayesian networks [Jen96], telecom-
munications [Gal68], pattern recognition [ESB09], machine learning [Mac02], quantum physics [Wil13], and biology
[Ada04]. In this work we focus on mutual information and its application to the above security scenario.
2.2. Computing Mutual Information in Probabilistic Systems
In this section we present two previous approaches to computing mutual information in probabilistic systems in
the context of quantitative information flow. Then we compare the two approaches to discuss their advantages and
disadvantages.
In the rest of the paper a probabilistic system S is defined as a finite set of execution traces such that each trace
tr records the values of all variables in S and is associated with a probability PS [tr ]. Note that S does not have
non-deterministic transitions. For the sake of generality we do not assume any specific constraints at this moment.
The main computational difficulty in calculating the mutual information I(X;Y ) between input X and output Y
lies in the computation of the joint probability distribution PXY of X and Y , especially when the system consists of a
large number of execution traces and when the distribution PXY is represented as a large data structure. In previous
work this computation has been performed either by the precise approach using program analysis techniques or by the
statistical approach using random sampling and statistics.
2.2.1. Precise Analysis
Precise analysis consists of analyzing all the execution traces of a system and determining for each trace tr , the input x,
output y, and probability PS [tr ] by concretely or symbolically executing the system. The precise analysis approach in
this paper follows the depth-first trace exploration technique presented by Biondi et al. [BLQ15].
To obtain the exact joint probability PXY [x, y] for each x ∈ X and y ∈ Y in a system S , we sum the probabilities
of all execution traces of S that have input x and output y, i.e.,
PXY [x, y] =
∑{
PS [tr ]
∣∣∣ tr ∈ S has input x and output y }
where PS is the probability distribution over the set of all traces in S. This means the computation time depends on
the number of traces in the system. If the system has a very large number of traces, it is intractable for the analyst to
precisely compute the joint distribution and consequently the mutual information.
In [YT14] the calculation of mutual information is shown to be computationally expensive. This computational
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Precise analysis Statistical analysis
Type White box Black/gray box
Analyzes Source code Implementation
Produces Exact value Estimate & accuracy evaluation
Reduces costs by Random sampling Knowledge of code & abstraction
Impractical for Large number of traces Large channel matrices
Table 1. Comparison of the precise and statistical analysis methods.
difficulty comes from the fact that entropy-based properties are hyperproperties [CS10] that are defined using all
execution traces of the system and therefore cannot be verified on each single trace. For example, when we investigate
the information leakage in a system, it is insufficient to check the leakage separately for each component of the system,
because the attacker may derive sensitive information by combining the outputs of different components. More generally,
the computation of entropy-based properties (such as the amount of leaked information) is not compositional, in the
sense that an entropy-based property of a system is not the (weighted) sum of those of the components.
For this reason, it is inherently difficult to naïvely combine analyses of different components of a system to compute
entropy-based properties. In fact, previous studies on the compositional approach in quantitative information flow
analysis have faced certain difficulties in obtaining useful bounds on information leakage [BK11, ES13, KG15, KCP17].
2.2.2. Statistical Analysis
Due to the complexity of precise analysis, some previous studies have focused on computing approximate values of
entropy-based measures. One of the common approaches is statistical analysis based on Monte Carlo methods, in
which approximate values are computed from repeated random sampling and their accuracy is evaluated using statistics.
Previous work on quantitative information flow has used statistical analysis to estimate mutual information [CCG10,
Mod89, Bri04], channel capacity [CCG10, BP14] and min-entropy leakage [CKN14, CK14].
In the statistical estimation of mutual information between two random variables X and Y in a probabilistic system,
the analyst executes the system many times and collects the execution traces, each of which has a pair of values
(x, y) ∈ X × Y corresponding to the input and output of the trace. This set of execution traces is used to estimate the
empirical joint distribution PˆXY of X and Y and then to estimate the mutual information Iˆ(X;Y ).
Note that the empirical distribution PˆXY is different from the true distribution PXY and thus the estimated mutual
information Iˆ(X;Y ) is different from the true value I(X;Y ). In fact, it is known that entropy-based measures such as
mutual information and min-entropy leakage have some bias and variance that depends on the number of collected
traces, the matrix size and other factors. However, results on statistics allow us to correct the bias of the estimate and
to compute the variance (and the 95% confidence interval). This way we can guarantee the quality of the estimation,
which differentiates the statistical approach from the testing approach.
2.2.3. Comparing the Two Analysis Methods
The cost of the statistical analysis is proportional to the size #X ×#Y of the joint distribution matrix (strictly speaking,
to the number of non-zero elements in the matrix). Therefore, this method is significantly more efficient than precise
analysis if the matrix is relatively small and the number of all traces is very large (for instance because the system’s
internal variables have a large range).
On the other hand, if the matrix is very large, the number of executions needs to be very large to obtain a reliable
and small confidence interval. In particular, for a small sample size, statistical analysis does not detect rare events, i.e.,
traces with a low probability that affect the result. Therefore the precise analysis is significantly more efficient than
statistical analysis if the number of all traces is relatively small and the matrix is relatively large (for instance because
the system’s internal variables have a small range).
The main differences between precise analysis and statistical analysis are summarized in Table 1.
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3. Overview of the Hybrid Statistical Estimation Method
In this section we overview a new method for estimating the mutual information between two random variables X (over
the inputs X ) and Y (over the outputs Y) in a system. The method, we call hybrid statistical estimation, integrates both
precise and statistical analyses to overcome the limitations on those previous approaches (explained in Section 2.2).
In our hybrid analysis method, we first decompose a given probabilistic system S into mutually disjoint components,
which we will define below, and then apply different types of analysis (with possibly different parameters) on different
components of the system. More specifically, for each component, our hybrid method chooses the faster analysis
between the precise and statistical analyses. Hence the hybrid analysis of the whole system is faster than the precise
analysis alone and than the statistical analysis alone, while it gives more accurate estimates than the statistical analysis
alone, as shown experimentally in Section 8.
To introduce the notion of components we recall that in Section 2.2 a probabilistic system S is defined as the set
of all execution traces such that each trace tr is associated with probability P[tr ] 2. Formally, a decomposition α of
S is defined a collection of mutually disjoint non-empty subsets of S: ∅ 6∈ α, S = ⋃Si∈α Si, and for any Si, Sj ∈ α,
Si 6= Sj implies Si ∩ Sj 6= ∅. Then each element of α is called a component. In this sense, components are a partition
of the execution traces of S. When S is executed, only one of S’s components is executed, since the components are
mutually disjoint. Hence Si is chosen to be executed with the probability P[Si].
In decomposing a system we roughly investigate the characteristics of each component’s behaviour to choose a
faster analysis method for each component. Note that information about a component like its number of traces and
the size of its joint sub-distribution matrix can be estimated heuristically before computing the matrix itself. This will
be explained in Section 7; before that section this information is assumed to be available. The choice of the analysis
method is as follows:
• If a component’s behaviour is deterministic, we perform a precise analysis on it.
• If a component’s behaviour is described as a joint sub-distribution matrix over small3 subsets of X and Y , then we
perform a statistical analysis on the component.
• If a component’s behaviour is described as a matrix over large3 subsets of X and Y , then we perform a precise
analysis on the component.
• By combining the analysis results on all components, we compute the estimated value of mutual information and its
variance (and confidence interval). See Section 4 for details.
• By incorporating information from qualitative information flow analysis, the analyst may obtain partial knowledge
on components and be able to reduce the sample sizes. See Section 5 for details.
See Section 7 for the details on how to decompose a system.
One of the main advantages of hybrid statistical estimation is that we guarantee the quality of the outcome by
removing its bias and providing its variance (and confidence interval) even though different kinds of analysis with
different parameters (such as sample sizes) are combined together.
Another advantage is the compositionality in estimating bias and variance. Since the sampling of execution traces
is performed independently for each component, we obtain that the bias and variance of mutual information can be
computed in a compositional way, i.e., the bias/variance for the entire system is the sum of those for the components.
This compositionality enables us to find optimal sample sizes for the different components that maximize the accuracy
of the estimation (i.e., minimize the variance) given a fixed total sample size for the entire system. On the other hand, the
computation of mutual information itself is not compositional [KCP17]: it requires calculating the full joint probability
distribution of the system by summing the joint sub-distributions of all components of the system.
Finally, note that these results can be applied to the estimation of Shannon entropy (Section 4.3) and conditional
Shannon entropy (Section 5.1.3) as special cases. The overview of all results is summarized in Table 2.
4. Hybrid Method for Statistical Estimation of Mutual Information
In this section we present a method for estimating the mutual information between two random variables X (over the
inputs X ) and Y (over the outputs Y) in a system, and for evaluating the precision and accuracy of the estimation.
2 Note that this work considers only probabilistic systems without non-deterministic transitions.
3 Relatively to the number of all execution traces of the component.
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Bias correction Variance computation Adaptive sampling
No knowledge Mutual information Theorem 4.1 Theorem 4.2 Theorem 6.1
on the system
Shannon entropy Proposition 4.3 Proposition 4.4 Proposition 6.2
Knowledge Mutual information Proposition 5.2 Proposition 5.3 Proposition 6.3
on the prior
Conditional entropy Proposition 5.4 Proposition 5.5 —
Abstraction-then-sampling Mutual information Theorem 5.6 Theorem 5.7 Theorem 6.4
Table 2. Our results on the hybrid method.
We consider a probabilistic system S that consists of (m + k) components S1, S2, . . . , Sm and T1, T2, . . . , Tk
each executed with probabilities θ1, θ2, . . . , θm and ξ1, ξ2, . . . , ξk, i.e., when S is executed, Si is executed with the
probability θi and Tj with the probability ξj . Let I = {1, 2, . . . ,m} and J = {1, 2, . . . , k}, one of which can be
empty. Then the probabilities of all components sum up to 1, i.e.,
∑
i∈I θi +
∑
j∈J ξj = 1. We assume that the analyst
is able to compute these probabilities by precise analysis. In the example in Fig. 1 the probabilities of the components
S1, S2, and T are explicitly given as θ1 = 0.25, θ2 = 0.45, and ξ1 = 0.3. However, in general they would be computed
by analyzing the behavior of the system before the system executes the three components. More details about how to
obtain this in practice are provided when discussing implementation in Section 7.
Once the system is decomposed into components, each component is analyzed either by precise analysis or by
statistical analysis. We assume that the analyst can run the component Si for each i ∈ I to record a certain number of
Si’s execution traces, and precisely analyze the components Tj for j ∈ J to record a certain symbolic representation
of Tj’s all execution traces, e.g., by static analysis of the source code (or of a specification that the code is known to
satisfy). In the example in Fig. 1, this means that the components S1 and S2 will be analyzed statistically producing
an approximation of their joint distributions, while the component T will be analyzed precisely obtaining its exact
joint distribution. The two estimates and one precise joint distributions will be composed to obtain a joint distribution
estimate for the whole system, as illustrated in Fig. 1b.
In the rest of this section we present a method for computing the joint probability distribution PˆXY (Section 3), for
estimating the mutual information Iˆ(X;Y ) (Section 4.1), and for evaluating the accuracy of the estimation (Section 4.2).
Then we show the application of our hybrid method to Shannon entropy estimation (Section 4.3).
In the estimation of mutual information between the two random variables X and Y in the system S, we need to
estimate the joint probability distribution PXY of X and Y .
In our approach this is obtained by combining the joint sub-probability distributions of X and Y for all the
components Si’s and Tj’s. More specifically, letRi andQj be the joint sub-distributions ofX and Y for the components
Si’s and Tj’s respectively. Then the joint (full) distribution PXY for the whole system S is defined by:
PXY [x, y]
def
=
∑
i ∈I
Ri[x, y] +
∑
j ∈J
Qj [x, y]
for x ∈ X and y ∈ Y . Note that for each i ∈ I and j ∈ J , the sums of all probabilities in the sub-distribution Ri and
in Qj respectively equal the probabilities θi (of executing Si) and ξj (of executing Tj).
To estimate the joint distribution PXY the analyst computes
• for each j ∈ J , the exact sub-distribution Qj for the component Tj by precise analysis on Tj , and
• for each i ∈ I, the empirical sub-distribution Rˆi for Si from a set of traces obtained by executing Si a certain
number ni of times.
More specifically, the empirical sub-distribution Rˆi is constructed as follows. When the component Si is executed
ni times, let Kixy be the number of traces that have input x ∈ X and output y ∈ Y . Then ni =
∑
x∈X ,y∈Y Kixy . From
these numbers Kixy of traces we compute the empirical joint (full) distribution Dˆi of X and Y by:
Dˆi [x, y]
def
=
Kixy
ni
.
Since Si is executed with probability θi, the sub-distribution Rˆi is given by Rˆi[x, y]
def
= θiDˆi [x, y] =
θiKixy
ni
.
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Then the analyst sums up these sub-distributions to obtain the joint distribution PˆXY for the whole system S:
PˆXY [x, y]
def
=
∑
i∈I
Rˆi[x, y] +
∑
j∈J
Qj [x, y] =
∑
i∈I
θiKixy
ni
+
∑
j∈J
Qj [x, y].
Note that Ri and Qj may have different matrix sizes and cover different parts of the joint distribution matrix PˆXY , so
they may have to be appropriately padded with zeroes for the summation.
4.1. Estimation of Mutual Information and Correction of its Bias
In this section we present our new method for estimating mutual information and for correcting its bias. For each
component Si let Di be the joint (full) distribution of X and Y obtained by normalizing Ri: Di [x, y] =
Ri[x,y]
θi
. Let
DXi [x] =
∑
y∈Y Di [x, y], DYi [y] =
∑
x∈X Di [x, y], and D = {(x, y) ∈ X × Y : PXY [x, y] 6= 0}.
Using the estimated joint distribution PˆXY we can compute the mutual information estimate Iˆ(X;Y ). Note that the
mutual information for the whole system is smaller than (or equals) the weighted sum of those for the components,
because of its convexity w.r.t. the channel matrix. Therefore it cannot be computed compositionally from those of the
components, i.e., it is necessary to compute the joint distribution matrix PˆXY for the whole system.
Since Iˆ(X;Y ) is obtained from a limited number of traces, it has bias, i.e., its expected value E
[
Iˆ(X;Y )
]
is
different from the true value I(X;Y ). The bias E
[
Iˆ(X;Y )
]
− I(X;Y ) in the estimation is quantified as follows.
Theorem 4.1 (Mean of estimated mutual information). The expected value E
[
Iˆ(X;Y )
]
of the estimated mutual
information is given by:
E
[
Iˆ(X;Y )
]
= I(X;Y ) +
∑
i∈I
θ2i
2ni
( ∑
(x,y)∈D
ϕixy −
∑
x∈X+
ϕix −
∑
y∈Y+
ϕiy
)
+O(n−2i )
where ϕixy =
Di [x,y]−Di [x,y]2
PXY [x,y]
, ϕix =
DXi [x]−DXi [x]2
PX [x]
and ϕiy =
DYi [y]−DYi [y]2
PY [y]
.
Proof sketch. Here we present only the basic idea. Appendices A.1 and A.2 present a proof of this theorem by showing
a more general claim, i.e., Theorem 5.6 in Section 5.2.
By properties of mutual information and Shannon entropy, we have:
E
[
Iˆ(X;Y )
]
− I(X;Y ) = E
[
Hˆ(X) + Hˆ(Y )− Hˆ(X,Y )
]
−
(
H(X) +H(Y )−H(X,Y )
)
=
(
E
[
Hˆ(X)
]
−H(X)
)
+
(
E
[
Hˆ(Y )
]
−H(Y )
)
−
(
E
[
Hˆ(X,Y )
]
−H(X,Y )
)
.
Hence it is sufficient to calculate the bias in Hˆ(X), Hˆ(Y ), and Hˆ(X,Y ), respectively.
We calculate the bias in Hˆ(X,Y ) as follows. Let fxy(K1xy,K2xy, . . . ,Kmxy) be the m-ary function defined by:
fxy(K1xy,K2xy, . . . ,Kmxy) =
(∑
i∈I
θiKixy
ni
+
∑
j∈J
Qj [x, y]
)
log
(∑
i∈I
θiKixy
ni
+
∑
j∈J
Qj [x, y]
)
,
which equals PˆXY [x, y] log PˆXY [x, y]. LetKxy = (K1xy,K2xy, . . . ,Kmxy). Then the empirical joint entropy is:
Hˆ(X,Y ) = −
∑
(x,y)∈D
PˆXY [x, y] log PˆXY [x, y] = −
∑
(x,y)∈D
fxy(Kxy).
Let Kixy = E[Kixy] for each i ∈ I and Kxy = E[Kxy]. By the Taylor expansion of fxy(Kxy) (w.r.t. the multiple
dependent variablesKxy) atKxy , we have:
fxy(Kxy) = fxy(Kxy) +
∑
i∈I
∂fxy(Kxy)
∂Kixy
(Kixy −Kixy) + 1
2
∑
i,j∈I
∂2fxy(Kxy)
∂Kixy∂Kjxy
(Kixy −Kixy)(Kjxy −Kjxy)+
∑
i∈I
O(K3ixy).
We use the following properties:
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• E[Kixy −Kixy] = 0, which is immediate from Kixy = E[Kixy].
• E[(Kixy −Kixy)(Kjxy −Kjxy)] = 0 if i 6= j, because Kixy and Kjxy are independent.
• E[(Kixy −Kixy)2] = V[Kixy] = niDi[x, y](1−Di[x, y]).
Then
E
[
Hˆ(X,Y )
]
= −
∑
(x,y)∈D
E[ fxy(Kxy) ]
= −
∑
(x,y)∈D
(
fxy(Kxy) +
1
2
∑
i∈I
∂2fxy(Kxy)
∂Kixy∂Kixy
E
[
(Kixy −Kixy)2
]
+O(K3ixy)
)
=−
∑
(x,y)∈D
(
fxy(Kxy) +
1
2
∑
i∈I
θ2i
n2iPXY [x,y]
niDi[x, y](1−Di[x, y]) +O(n−2i )
)
=H(X,Y )−
∑
i∈I
θ2i
2ni
∑
(x,y)∈D
ϕixy +O(n−2i ),
where the derivation of the equalities is detailed in Appendix A. Hence the bias in estimating H(X,Y ) is given by:
E
[
Hˆ(X,Y )
]
−H(X,Y ) = −
∑
i∈I
θ2i
2ni
∑
(x,y)∈D
ϕixy +O(n−2i ).
Analogously, we can calculate the bias in Hˆ(X) and Hˆ(Y ) to derive the theorem. See Appendices A.1 and A.2 for the
details.
Since the higher-order terms in the formula are negligible when the sample sizes ni are large enough, we use the
following as the point estimate of the mutual information:
pe = Iˆ(X;Y )−
∑
i∈I
θ2i
2ni
( ∑
(x,y)∈D̂
ϕixy −
∑
x∈X +̂
ϕix −
∑
y∈Y+̂
ϕiy
)
where ϕ̂ixy, ϕ̂ix and ϕ̂iy are respectively empirical values of ϕixy, ϕix and ϕiy that are computed from traces; i.e.,
ϕ̂ixy =
Dˆi [x,y]−Dˆi [x,y]2
PˆXY [x,y]
, ϕ̂ix =
Dˆi [x]−Dˆi [x]2
PˆXY [x]
, and ϕ̂iy =
Dˆi [y]−Dˆi [y]2
PˆXY [y]
. Then the bias is closer to 0 when the sample
sizes ni are larger.
4.2. Evaluation of the Accuracy of Estimation
In this section we present how to evaluate the accuracy of mutual information estimation. The quality of the estimation
depends on the sample sizes ni and other factors, and can be evaluated using the variance of the estimate Iˆ(X;Y ).
Theorem 4.2 (Variance of estimated mutual information). The variance V
[
Iˆ(X;Y )
]
of the estimated mutual in-
formation is given by:
V
[
Iˆ(X;Y )
]
=
∑
i∈I
θ2i
ni
( ∑
(x,y)∈D
Di [x, y]
(
1 + log PX [x]PY [y]PXY [x,y]
)2
−
( ∑
(x,y)∈D
Di [x, y]
(
1 + log PX [x]PY [y]PXY [x,y]
))2)
+O(n−2i ).
Proof sketch. The variance is calculated using the following:
V
[
Iˆ(X;Y )
]
= V
[
Hˆ(X) + Hˆ(Y )− Hˆ(X,Y )
]
= V
[
Hˆ(X)
]
+ V
[
Hˆ(Y )
]
+ V
[
Hˆ(X,Y )
]
+ 2Cov
[
Hˆ(X), Hˆ(Y )
]
− 2Cov
[
Hˆ(X), Hˆ(X,Y )
]
− 2Cov
[
Hˆ(Y ), Hˆ(X,Y )
]
.
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The calculation of these variances and covariances and the whole proof are shown in Appendices A.3 and A.4. (We will
present a proof of this theorem by showing a more general claim, i.e., Theorem 5.7 in Section 5.2).
The confidence interval of the estimate of mutual information is also useful to show how accurate the estimate is. A
smaller confidence interval corresponds to a more reliable estimate. To compute the confidence interval approximately,
we assume the sampling distribution of the estimate Iˆ(X;Y ) as a normal distribution. 4 Then the confidence interval is
calculated using the variance v obtained by Theorem 4.2 as follows. Given a significance level α, we denote by zα/2 the
z-score for the 100(1− α2 ) percentile point. Then the (1− α) confidence interval of the estimate is given by:
[ max(0, pe − zα/2
√
v), pe + zα/2
√
v ] .
For example, we use the z-score z0.0025 = 1.96 to compute the 95% confidence interval. To ignore the higher order
terms the sample size
∑
i∈I ni needs to be at least 4·#X ·#Y .
By Theorems 4.1 and 4.2, the bias and variance for the whole system can be computed compositionally from those
for the components, unlike the mutual information itself. This allows us to adaptively optimize the sample sizes for the
components as we will see in Section 6.
4.3. Application to Estimation of Shannon Entropy
Hybrid statistical estimation can also be used to estimate the Shannon entropy H(X) of a random variable X in a
probabilistic system. Although the results for Shannon entropy are straightforward from those for mutual information,
we present the formulas here for completeness. For each i ∈ I let DXi be the sub-distribution of X for the component
Si. Then the mean and variance of the estimate are obtained in the same way as in the Sections 4.1 and 4.2.
Proposition 4.3 (Mean of estimated Shannon entropy). The expected value E
[
Hˆ(X)
]
of the estimated Shannon
entropy is given by:
E
[
Hˆ(X)
]
= H(X)−
∑
i∈I
θ2i
2ni
∑
x∈X+
DXi [x] (1−DXi [x])
PX [x]
+O(n−2i ).
See Appendix A.2 for the proof. From this we obtain the bias of the Shannon entropy estimates.
Proposition 4.4 (Variance of estimated Shannon entropy). The variance V
[
Hˆ(X)
]
of the estimated Shannon en-
tropy is given by:
V
[
Hˆ(X)
]
=
∑
i∈I
θ2i
ni
(∑
x∈X+
DXi [x]
(
1 + logPX [x]
)2
−
(∑
x∈X+
DXi [x]
(
1 + logPX [x]
))2)
+O(n−2i ).
See Appendix A.4 for the proof. From this we obtain the confidence interval of the Shannon entropy estimates.
5. Estimation Using Prior Knowledge about Systems
In this section we show how to use prior knowledge about systems to improve the accuracy of the estimation, i.e., to
make the variance (and the confidence interval size) smaller and reduce the required sample sizes.
5.1. Approximate Estimation Using Knowledge of Prior Distributions
Our hybrid statistical estimation method integrates both precise and statistical analysis, and it can be seen as a
generalization and extension of previous work [CCG10, Mod89, Bri04].
4 In fact, Brillinge [Bri04] shows that the sampling distribution of mutual information values is approximately normal for large sample size, and
Chatzikokolakis et al. [CCG10] employ this fact to approximately compute the confidence interval. We also empirically verified that the sampling
distribution is closer to the normal distribution when the ni’s are larger enough, and the evaluation of the obtained confidence interval will be
demonstrated by experiments in Section 8.1.
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Due to an incorrect computation of the bias, the state-of-the-art statistical analysis tool LeakWatch [CKN14, CKNb]
does not correctly estimate mutual information. We explain this problem in Section 5.1.1 and show how to fix it in
Section 5.1.2. We extend this result to the estimation of conditional entropy in Section 5.1.3.
5.1.1. State of the Art
For example, Chatzikokolakis et.al. [CCG10] present a method for estimating mutual information between two random
variables X (over secret input values X ) and Y (over observable output values Y) when the analyst knows the (prior)
distribution PX of X . In the estimation they collect execution traces by running a system for each secret value x ∈ X .
Thanks to the precise knowledge of PX , they have more precise and accurate estimates than the other previous
work [Mod89, Bri04] that also estimates PX from execution traces.
Estimation using the precise knowledge of PX is an instance of our result if a system is decomposed into the
component Sx for each secret x ∈ X = I. If we assume all joint probabilities are non-zero, the following approximate
result in [CCG10] follows from Theorem 4.1.
Corollary 5.1. The expected value E
[
Iˆ(X;Y )
]
of the estimated mutual information is given by:
E
[
Iˆ(X;Y )
]
= I(X;Y ) + (#X−1)(#Y−1)2n +O(n−2),
where #X and #Y denote the numbers of possible secrets and observables respectively.
Using this result the bias E
[
Iˆ(X;Y )
]
− I(X;Y ) is calculated as (#X−1)(#Y−1)2n in [CCG10], which depends
only on the size of the joint distribution matrix. However, the bias can be strongly influenced by probability values
close or equivalent to zero in the distribution; therefore their approximate results can be correct only when all joint
probabilities are non-zero and large enough, which is a strong restriction in practice. We show in Section 8.2.3 that the
tool LeakWatch [CKN14] uses Corollary 5.1, and consequently miscalculates bias and gives an estimate far from the
true value in the presence of very small probability values.
5.1.2. Our Estimation Using Knowledge of Prior Distributions
To overcome these issues we present more general results in the case in which the analyst knows the prior distribution
PX . We assume that a system S is decomposed into the disjoint component Six for each index i ∈ I and input x ∈ X ,
and that each Six is executed with probability θix in the system S. Let Θ = {θix : i ∈ I, x ∈ X}.
Estimation of Mutual Information In the estimation of mutual information we separately execute each component
Six multiple times to collect execution traces. Unlike the previous work the analyst may change the number of executions
niPX [x] to niλi[x] where λi[x] is an importance prior that the analyst chooses to determine how the sample size ni is
allocated for each component Six. An adaptive way of choosing the importance priors will be presented in Section 6.
Let Λ = {λi : i ∈ I}.
Given the number Kixy of Six’s traces with output y, we define the conditional distribution Di of output given input:
Di [y|x]def= Kixyniλi[x] . Let Mixy=
θ2ix
λi[x]
Di [y|x] (1−Di [y|x]). Then we can calculate the mean and variance of the mutual
information IˆΘ,Λ(X;Y ) using Dˆi , Θ, Λ as follows.
Proposition 5.2 (Mean of mutual information estimated using the knowledge of the prior). The expected value
E
[
IˆΘ,Λ(X;Y )
]
of the estimated mutual information is given by:
E
[
IˆΘ,Λ(X;Y )
]
= I(X;Y ) +
∑
i∈I
1
2ni
∑
y∈Y+
(∑
x∈Dy
Mixy
PXY [x,y]
−
∑
x∈Dy Mixy
PY [y]
)
+O(n−2i ).
Proposition 5.3 (Variance of mutual information estimated using the knowledge of the prior). The variance
V
[
IˆΘ,Λ(X;Y )
]
of the estimated mutual information is given by:
V
[
IˆΘ,Λ(X;Y )
]
=
∑
i∈I
∑
x∈X+
θ2ix
niλi[x]
(∑
y∈Dx
Di[y|x]
(
log PY [y]PXY [x,y]
)2
−
(∑
y∈Dx
Di[y|x]
(
log PY [y]PXY [x,y]
))2)
+O(n−2i ).
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See Appendix A.6 for the proofs.
5.1.3. Estimation of Conditional Entropy
The new method can also estimate the conditional Shannon entropy H(X|Y ) of a random variable X given a random
variable Y in a system. In the context of quantitative security, H(X|Y ) represents the uncertainty of a secret X after
observing an output Y of the system. The mean and variance of the conditional entropy are obtained from those of the
mutual information in the case where the analyst knows the prior.
Proposition 5.4 (Mean of estimated conditional entropy). The expected value E
[
HˆΘ,Λ(X|Y )
]
of the estimated
conditional Shannon entropy is given by H(X)− E
[
IˆΘ,Λ(X;Y )
]
where E
[
IˆΘ,Λ(X;Y )
]
is the expected value of the
mutual information in the case where the analyst knows the prior (shown in Proposition 5.2).
Proof. By H(X|Y ) = H(X)− I(X;Y ), we obtain E
[
HˆΘ,Λ(X|Y )
]
= H(X)− E
[
IˆΘ,Λ(X;Y )
]
.
Proposition 5.5 (Variance of estimated conditional entropy). The variance V
[
HˆΘ,Λ(X|Y )
]
of the estimated con-
ditional Shannon entropy coincides with the variance V
[
IˆΘ,Λ(X;Y )
]
of the mutual information in the case where the
analyst knows the prior (shown in Proposition 5.3).
Proof. By H(X|Y ) = H(X)− I(X;Y ), we obtain V
[
HˆΘ,Λ(X|Y )
]
= V
[
IˆΘ,Λ(X;Y )
]
.
5.2. Abstraction-Then-Sampling Using Partial Knowledge of Components
 x1
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x4
y1 y2 y3 y4
X
Y
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0.075 0.05
0
0
0.1 0.1
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00.05
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0
0.025
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0.025
Fig. 2: Joint distribution composed of 3 components.
All the rows of component S1 are identical, hence
abstraction-then-sampling can be used on it.
In this section we extend the hybrid statistical estimation
method to consider the case in which the analyst knows that
the output of some of the components does not depend on the
secret input (for instance by static code analysis). Such prior
knowledge may help us abstract components into simpler ones
and thus reduce the sample size for the statistical analysis.
We illustrate the basic idea of this “abstraction-then-
sampling” technique as follows. Let us consider an analyst
who knows two pairs (x, y) and (x′, y′) of inputs and out-
puts have the same probability in a component Si: Di [x, y] =
Di [x
′, y′]. Then, when we construct the empirical distribu-
tion Dˆi from a set of traces, we can count the number
Ki{(x,y),(x′,y′)} of traces having either (x, y) or (x′, y′), and
divide it by two: Kixy = Kix′y′ =
Ki{(x,y),(x′,y′)}
2 . Then
to achieve a certain accuracy, the sample size required for
the estimation using the prior knowledge on the equality
Kixy = Kix′y′ is smaller than that without using it.
In the following we generalize this idea to deal with similar information that the analyst may possess about the
components. Let us consider a (probabilistic) system in which for some components, observing the output provides no
information on the input. Assume that the analyst is aware of this by qualitative information analysis (for verifying
non-interference). Then such a component Si has a sub-channel matrix where all non-zero rows have an identical
conditional distribution of outputs given inputs [CT06]. Consequently, when we estimate the #Xi ×#Yi matrix of Si
it suffices to estimate one of the rows, hence the number of executions is proportional to #Yi instead of #Xi ×#Yi.
The abstraction-then-sampling approach can be simply explained by referring to the joint distribution matrix in
Fig. 2. Note that each row of the sub-distribution matrix for component S1 is identical, even though the rows of the joint
matrix are not, and assume that the analyst knows this by analyzing the code of the program and finding out that for
component S1 the output is independent from the input. Then the analyst would know that it is unnecessary to execute
the component separately for each possible input value in S1: it is sufficient to execute the component only for one
value of the input, and to apply the results to each row in the sub-distribution matrix for component S1. This allows the
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analyst to obtain more precise results and a smaller variance (and confidence interval) on the estimation given a fixed
total sample size ni for the component.
Note that even when some components leak no information, computing the mutual information for the whole system
requires constructing the matrix of the system, hence the matrices of all components.
Let I? be the set of indexes of components that have channel matrices whose non-zero rows consist of the same
conditional distribution. For each i ∈ I?, we define pii[x] as the probability of having an input x in the component Si.
To estimate the mutual information for the whole system, we apply the abstraction-then-sampling technique to the
components I? and the standard sampling technique (shown in Section 4) to the components I \ I?.
Then the mean and variance of the mutual information are as follows. The following results show that the bias and
confidence interval are narrower than when not using the prior knowledge of components.
Theorem 5.6 (Mean of mutual information estimated using the abstraction-then-sampling). The expected value
E
[
IˆI?(X;Y )
]
of the estimated mutual information is given by:
E
[
IˆI?(X;Y )
]
= I(X;Y ) +
∑
i∈I\I?
θ2i
2ni
(∑
(x,y)∈D
ϕixy −
∑
x∈X+
ϕix −
∑
y∈Y+
ϕiy
)
+
∑
i∈I?
θ2i
2ni
(∑
(x,y)∈D
ψixy −
∑
y∈Y+
ϕiy
)
+O(n−2i )
where ψixy
def
= Di [x,y]pii[x]−Di [x,y]
2
PXY [x,y]
.
See Appendix A.1 for the proof.
Theorem 5.7 (Variance of mutual information estimated using the abstraction-then-sampling). The variance
V
[
IˆI?(X;Y )
]
of the estimated mutual information is given by:
V
[
IˆI?(X;Y )
]
=
∑
i∈I\I?
θ2i
ni
( ∑
(x,y)∈D
Di [x, y]
(
1 + logPX [x]PY [y]PXY [x,y]
)2
−
( ∑
(x,y)∈D
Di [x, y]
(
1 + logPX [x]PY [y]PXY [x,y]
))2)
+
∑
i∈I?
θ2i
ni
( ∑
y∈Y+
DYi [y]γ
2
ixy −
( ∑
y∈Y+
DYi [y]γixy
)2)
+ O(n−2i )
where γixy
def
= logPY [y]−
∑
x∈X
pii[x] logPXY [x, y].
See Appendix A.3 for the proof.
6. Adaptive Optimization of Sample Sizes
In this section we present a method for deciding the sample size ni of each component Si to estimate mutual information
with an optimal accuracy when using the hybrid estimation technique in Section 4 and its variants using prior information
on the system in Section 5. The proof for all results in this section can be found in Appendix A.5.
Mutual Information To decide the sample sizes we take into account the trade-off between accuracy and cost of the
statistical analysis: The computational cost increases proportionally to the sample size ni (i.e., the number of Si’s
execution traces), while a larger sample size ni provides a smaller variance hence a more accurate estimate.
More specifically, given a budget of a total sample size n for the whole system, we obtain an optimal accuracy
of the estimate by adjusting each component’s sample size ni 5 (under the constraint n =
∑
i∈I ni). To compute the
optimal sample sizes, we first run each component to collect a small number (compared to n, for instance dozens) of
execution traces. Then we calculate certain intermediate values in computing the variance and determine sample sizes
for further executions. Formally, let vi be the following intermediate value of the variance for the component Si:
vi = θ
2
i
(∑
(x,y)∈D
Dˆi [x, y]
(
1 + log P̂X [x]P̂Y [y]
P̂XY [x,y]
)2
−
(∑
(x,y)∈D
Dˆi [x, y]
(
1 + log P̂X [x]P̂Y [y]
P̂XY [x,y]
))2)
.
5 This idea resembles the importance sampling in statistical model checking in that the sample size is adjusted to make the estimate more accurate.
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Then we find ni’s that minimize the variance v =
∑
i∈I
vi
ni
of the estimate by using the following theorem.
Theorem 6.1 (Optimal sample sizes). Given the total sample size n and the above intermediate variance vi of the
component Si for each i ∈ I , the variance of the mutual information estimate is minimized if, for all i ∈ I , the sample
size ni for Si is given by: ni =
√
vin∑m
j=1
√
vj
.
Shannon Entropy Analogously to Theorem 6.1 we can adaptively optimize the sample sizes in the estimation of
Shannon entropy in Section 4.3. To compute the optimal sample sizes we define v′i by:
v′i = θ
2
i
(∑
x∈X+
DXi [x]
(
1 + logPX [x]
)2
−
(∑
x∈X+
DXi [x]
(
1 + logPX [x]
))2)
+O(n−2i ).
Then we can compute the optimal sample sizes by using the following proposition.
Proposition 6.2 (Optimal sample sizes for Shannon entropy estimation). Given the total sample size n and the
above intermediate variance v′i of the component Si for each i ∈ I, the variance of the Shannon entropy estimate is
minimized if, for all i ∈ I, the sample size ni for Si satisfies ni =
√
v′in∑m
j=1
√
v′j
.
Knowledge of the Prior Analogously to Theorem 6.1, the sample sizes ni and the importance priors λi can be
adaptively optimized when the prior distribution of the input is known to the analyst (as presented in Section 5.1).
Proposition 6.3 (Optimal sample sizes when knowing the prior). For each i ∈ I and x ∈ X , let vix be the follow-
ing intermediate variance of the component Six.
vix = θ
2
ix
(∑
y∈Dx
Dˆi [y|x]
(
log P̂Y [y]
P̂XY [x,y]
)2
−
(∑
y∈Dx
Dˆi [y|x]
(
log P̂Y [y]
P̂XY [x,y]
))2)
.
Given the total sample size n, the variance of the estimated mutual information is minimized if, for all i ∈ I and x ∈ X ,
the sample size ni and the importance prior λi satisfy: niλi[x] =
√
vixn∑m
j=1
√
vjx
.
Abstraction-then-sampling Finally, the sample sizes can be optimized for the abstraction-then-sampling approach in
Section 5.2 by using the following theorem.
Theorem 6.4 (Optimal sample sizes using the abstraction-then-sampling). Let v?i be the following intermediate
variance of the component Si:
v?i =

θ2i
( ∑
(x,y)∈D
Dˆi [x, y]
(
1 + log PˆX [x]PˆY [y]
PˆXY [x,y]
)2
−
( ∑
(x,y)∈D
Dˆi [x, y]
(
1 + log PˆX [x]PˆY [y]
PˆXY [x,y]
))2)
if i ∈ I \ I?
θ2i
( ∑
y∈Y+
DˆYi [y]γˆ
2
ixy −
( ∑
y∈Y+
DˆYi [y]γˆixy
)2)
if i ∈ I?
Given the total sample size n, the variance of the estimated mutual information is minimized if, for all i ∈ I and x ∈ X ,
the sample size ni is given by: ni =
√
v?i n∑m
j=1
√
v?j
.
7. Implementation in the HyLeak Tool
We describe how HyLeak estimates the Shannon leakage of a given program, i.e., the mutual information between
secret and output, implementing the hybrid statistical estimation procedure described above. The tool determines which
components of the program to analyze with precise analysis and which with statistical analysis, and inserts appropriate
annotations in the code. The components are analyzed with the chosen technique and the results are composed into a
joint probability distribution of the secret and observable variables. Finally, the mutual information and its confidence
interval are computed from the joint distribution.
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The HyLeak tool, including user documentation and source code is freely available at https://project.inria.fr/hyleak/.
Multiple examples and the scripts to generate the results are also provided.
HyLeak is very simple to use. The code of the system to analyze is written in a file e.g., system.hyleak. We
invoke the tool with the command:
./hyleak system.hyleak
The tool generates various.pp text files with analysis information and the control flow graph of the program.
Finally, it outputs the prior and posterior Shannon entropy estimates for the secret, the estimated Shannon leakage of
the program before and after bias correction, and its confidence interval. HyLeak can also print the channel matrix and
additional information; the full list of arguments is printed by ./hyleak -h.
7.1. Illustrating Example: Random Walk
Consider the following random walk problem (modeled in Fig. 3).
The secret is the initial location of an agent, encoded by a single natural number representing an approximate
distance from a given point, e.g., in meters. Then the agent takes a fixed number of steps. At each step the distance of
the agent increases or decreases by 10 meters with the same probability. After this fixed number of random walk steps,
the final location of the agent is revealed, and the attacker uses it to guess the initial location of the agent.
This problem is too complicated to analyze by precise analysis, because the analysis needs to explore every possible
combination of random paths, amounting to an exponential number in the random walk steps. It is also intractable to
analyze with a fully statistical approach, since there are hundreds of possible secret values and the program has to be
simulated many times for each of them to sufficiently observe the agent’s behavior.
As shown in Section 8, HyLeak’s hybrid approach computes the leakage significantly faster than the fully precise
analysis and more accurately than the fully statistical analysis.
7.2. Architecture
The HyLeak tool implementation consists of the following 4 steps. Steps 1 and 2 are implemented with different ANTLR
parsers [Par07]. The implementation of Step 3 inherits some code from the QUAIL tool [BLTW, BLTW13, BLQ15] to
employ QUAIL’s optimization techniques for precise analysis, i.e., parallel analysis of execution traces and compact
Markovian state representation.
Step 1: Preprocessing
Step 1a. Lexing, parsing and syntax checking. HyLeak starts by lexical analysis, macro substitution and syntax
analysis. In macro substitution the constants defined in the input program are replaced with their declared values, and
simple operations are resolved immediately. In the example in Fig. 3, this replaces the value of constant MAX on Line
24 with its declared value from Line 1. The tool checks whether the input program correctly satisfies the language
syntax. In case of syntax errors, an error message describing the problem is produced and execution is terminated.
Step 1b. Loop unrolling and array expansion. for loops ranging over fixed intervals are unrolled to optimize the
computation of variable ranges and thus program decomposition in Step 2. In the example in Fig. 3, the for loop in
Line 24 gets replaced by a fixed number of repetitions of its code with increasing values of the variable time. Similarly,
arrays are replaced with multiple variables indexed by their position number in the array. Note that these techniques are
used only to optimize program decomposition and not required to compute the leakage in programs with arbitrary loops.
Step 2: Program Decomposition and Internal Code Generation
If a simulate or simulate-abs statement is present in the code, the program decomposition step is skipped and
such statements are used to determine program decomposition.
The code may be decomposed heuristically only at conditional branching to efficiently compute the probability of
each component being executed. Moreover, each component must be a terminal in the control flow graph, hence no
component is executed afterwards. This is because the estimation method requires that the channel matrix for the system
is the weighted sum of those for its components, and that the weight of a component is the probability of executing it,
as explained in Sections 3.
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1 const MAX:=14;
2 secret int32 sec := [201,800];
3 observable int32 obs := 0;
4 public int32 loc := 0;
5 public int32 seed := 0;
6 public int32 ran := 0;
7 if sec ≤ 250// sec:[201,800]; TOT_OBS = 1 TOT_INT = 1; SEC DEP
8 then
9 loc := 200;
10 else if sec ≤ 350 then
11 loc := 300;
12 else if sec ≤ 450 then
13 loc := 400;
14 else if sec ≤ 550 then
15 loc := 500;
16 else if sec ≤ 650 then
17 loc := 600;
18 else if sec ≤ 750 then
19 loc := 700;
20 else
21 loc := 800;
22 end
23 simulate-abs;// loc: [200,800]; sec: [201,800]; TOT_OBS = 1; TOT_INT = 601
24 for time in [0,MAX] do
25 ran := random(0,9);
26 if ran ≤ 5 then
27 loc := loc + 10;
28 else
29 loc := loc - 10;
30 end
// loc: [50,950]; ran: [0,9], TOT_OBS = 1; TOT_INT = 9010
31 end
32 obs := loc; // obs: [50,950]; TOT_OBS = 901; TOT_INT = 9010
33 return;
Fig. 3. Source code for the Random Walk illustrative example explained in Section 7.1. The comments show the
estimates for the value ranges of some variables, as computed by HyLeak following Step 2 of Section 7.2, where
TOT_OBS represent the estimate of the possible combinations of values of all observable variables and TOT_INT the
estimate of the possible combinations of values of all internal variables. The red simulate-abs statement in Line
23 shows where the statement will be automatically added to implement the division into components, as explained in
Step 2 of Section 7.2 and in more details in Section 7.3.
The analysis method and its parameters for each component Si are decided by estimating the computational cost
of analyzing Si. Let Zi be the set of all internal randomness (i.e., the non-secret variables whose values are assigned
according to probability distributions) in Si. Then the cost of the statistical analysis is proportional to Si’s sub-channel
matrix size #Xi ×#Yi, while the cost of the precise analysis is proportional to the number of all traces in Si (in the
worst case proportional to #Xi ×#Zi). Hence the cost estimation is reduced to counting #Yi and #Zi.
To obtain this, for each variable and each code line, an estimation of the number of possible values of the variable
at the specific code line is computed. This is used to evaluate at each point in the input program whether it would be
more expensive to use precise or statistical analysis. These estimations are shown as comments for different lines of the
source code in Fig. 3. To reduce the computational cost of the estimation of variable ranges, we apply ad-hoc heuristics
to obtain approximate estimates.
After determining the decomposition of the program, HyLeak automatically adds simulate and/or simulate-abs
statements in the code to signal which parts of the input program should be analyzed with standard random sampling
(Section 4) and with abstraction-then-sampling (Section 5.2) respectively. For instance, since no annotations originally
exist in the example source code in Fig. 3, HyLeak adds the simulate-abs statement (written in red) on Line 23.
The procedure for decomposition is shown in Fig. 5 and is illustrated in Section 7.3 using the Random Walk example of
Fig. 3. While the decomposition procedure is automated, it is a heuristic that does not guarantee to produce an optimal
decomposition. Hence for usability the choice of analysis can be controlled by user’s annotations on the code.
At the end, the input program is translated into a simplified internal language. Conditional statements and loops
(if, for, and while) are rewritten into if-goto statements.
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Step 3: Program Analysis
Fig. 4: Control flow graph for the input code of Fig. 3. The
red node corresponds to the simulate-abs statement on
Line 23 of Fig. 3. Each arrow entering the red node comes
from a symbolic path with different secret and internal values,
inducing a different component.
In this step the tool analyzes the executions of the
program using the two approaches.
Step 3a. Precise analysis. The tool performs a
depth-first symbolic execution of all possible ex-
ecution traces of the input program, until it finds
a return, simulate, or simulate-abs state-
ment. When reaching a return statement the tool
recognizes the symbolic path as terminated and
stores its secret and output values. In the cases
of simulate and simulate-abs statements it
halts the symbolic path, saves the resulting program
state, and schedules it for standard random sampling
(Section 4) or for abstraction-then-sampling (Sec-
tion 5.2), respectively, starting from the saved pro-
gram state. In the example in Fig. 3, the tool analyzes
the code precisely and generates one symbolic path
for each of the possible if-elseif-else-end
statements from Line 7 to Line 22, so 7 symbolic
paths in total (as shown in the control flow graph
of the code in Fig. 4). Then each of the 7 symbolic
paths meets the simulate-abs statement in Line
23, so they get removed from precise analysis and
scheduled for abstraction-then-sampling.
Step 3b. Statistical analysis. The tool performs
all the statistical analyses and abstraction-then-
sampling analyses, using the saved program states
from Step 3a as starting point of each component to
analyze statistically. The sample size for each sim-
ulation is automatically decided by using heuristics
to have better accuracy with less sample size, as
explained in Sections 4 and 5. The results of each
analysis is stored as an appropriate joint probability
sub-distribution between secret and observable val-
ues. In the example in Fig. 3, each of the 7 symbolic
paths scheduled for abstraction-then-sampling gets
analyzed with the technique. For each of the sym-
bolic paths HyLeak choses a value of the secret and
samples only that one, then applies the results for
all secret values of the component. HyLeak recom-
putes the assignment of samples to the components
for each 10% of the total samples, following the
optimal sample sizes computed for abstraction-then-
sampling components in Theorem 6.4.
Step 4: Leakage Estimation
In this step the tool aggregates all the data collected
by the precise and statistical analyses (performed in
Steps 3) and estimates the Shannon leakage of the input program, together with evaluation of the estimation. This is
explained in detail together with the program decomposition in Section 7.3.
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1. Build the control flow graph of the system.
2. Mark all possible components based on each conditional branching. Each possible component must be a
terminal as explained in Section 4.
3. For each possible component Si, check whether it is deterministic or not (by syntactically checking an
occurrence of a probabilistic assignment or a probabilistic function call). If it is, mark the component for
precise analysis, since deterministic systems necessarily have a smaller number of traces.
4. For each possible component Si, check whether Si’s output variables are independent of its input variables
inside Si (by qualitative information flow). If so, mark that the abstraction-then-sampling technique in
Section 5.2 is to be used on the component, meaning that component Si will be sampled on a single secret
input value and the results will be applied to all secret values.
5. For each Si, estimate an approximate range size #Zi of its internal variables and #Yi of its observable
variables.
6. Looking from the leaves to the root of the control flow graph, estimate the cost of statistical and precise
analyses, decide the decomposition into components, and mark each component for the cheaper analysis
between the two. (For example, use a heuristics that marks each component Si for precise analysis if
#Zi ≤ #Xi and for statistical analysis otherwise.)
7. Join together adjacent components if they are marked for precise analysis, or if they are marked for statistical
analysis and have the same input and output ranges.
8. For each component, perform precise analysis or statistical analysis as marked.
Fig. 5. Procedure for the decomposition of a system into components given its source code described in Section 3. The
actual implementation here uses the control flow graph of the system to guide the procedure.
7.3. On the Division into Components of the Random Walk Benchmark
In this section we briefly discuss how the Random Walk example in Fig. 3 can be divided into components using
the procedure in Fig. 5. The procedure in Fig. 5 shows in more detail how to implement the procedure described in
Section 3. In the implementation, the construction of a the control flow graph of the system is used to guide the division
into components.
The control flow graph generated by HyLeak is shown in Fig. 4. Note that HyLeak has added a simulate-abs
statement to the code, visible in the control flow graph.
The control flow graph in Fig. 4 helps understanding how HyLeak has implicitly divided the program into
components. Note that the simulate-abs node marked in red has 7 in-edges. Each of these edges corresponds
to a different symbolic path (i.e., a set of execution traces following the same edge), with different possible values
for the secret variable sec and the internal variable loc. HyLeak has determined heuristically that at Line 23 the
number of possible values of the observable variables (TOT_OBS = 1) is smaller than the number of possible values
of internal variables (TOT_INT = 601), hence statistical simulation will be more efficient than precise analysis on
these components. Also, in the code after line 23, HyLeak has determined by syntactically analyzing the code that the
values of the observable variables do not depend on the secret, hence each row of the sub-channel matrix for each of
these components is identical, much like component S1 in Fig. 2.
Hence, the abstraction-then-sampling technique of Section 5.2 can be applied, meaning that the behavior of each
component will be simulated only for a single value of the secret in the set of possible secret values of the component,
and the results will be applied to each row of the channel matrix.
Now that the analysis has gathered all the necessary information, HyLeak computes the leakage of the system under
analysis. More specifically, it constructs an (approximate) joint posterior distribution of the secret and observable values
of the input program from all the collected data produced by Step 3, as explained in Section 3. Then the tool estimates
the Shannon leakage value from the joint distribution, including bias correction (see Sections 4 and 5). Finally, a 95%
confidence interval for the estimated leakage value is computed to roughly evaluate the quality of the analysis.
In the example in Fig. 3, HyLeak outputs the prior Shannon entropy 8.9658, the posterior Shannon entropy 7.0428,
the Shannon leakage (after bias correction) 1.9220, and the confidence interval [1.9214, 1.9226].
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Fig. 6. Distribution of mutual information estimate
and its confidence interval.
Observable
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Se
cr
et
0 0.2046 0.1102 0.0315 0.0529 0.1899 0.0064 0.0791 0.1367 0.0386 0.1501
1 0.0852 0.0539 0.1342 0.0567 0.1014 0.1254 0.0554 0.1115 0.0919 0.1844
2 0.1702 0.0542 0.0735 0.0914 0.0639 0.1322 0.1119 0.0512 0.1172 0.1343
3 0.0271 0.1915 0.0764 0.1099 0.0982 0.0761 0.0843 0.1364 0.0885 0.1116
4 0.0957 0.1977 0.0266 0.0741 0.1496 0.2177 0.0610 0.0617 0.0841 0.0318
5 0.0861 0.1275 0.1565 0.1193 0.1321 0.1716 0.0136 0.0984 0.0183 0.0766
6 0.0173 0.1481 0.1371 0.1037 0.1834 0.0271 0.1289 0.1690 0.0036 0.0818
7 0.0329 0.0825 0.0333 0.1622 0.1530 0.1378 0.0561 0.1479 0.0212 0.1731
8 0.1513 0.0435 0.0527 0.2022 0.0189 0.2159 0.0718 0.0063 0.1307 0.1067
9 0.0488 0.1576 0.1871 0.1117 0.1453 0.0349 0.0549 0.1766 0.0271 0.056
Fig. 7. Channel matrix for the experiments in Section 8.1.
8. Evaluation
We evaluate experimentally the effectiveness of our hybrid method compared to the state of the art. We first discuss the
cost and quality of the estimation, then test the hybrid method against fully precise/fully statistical analyses on Shannon
leakage benchmarks.
8.1. On the Tradeoff between the Cost and Quality of Estimation
In the hybrid statistical estimation, the estimate takes different values probabilistically, because it is computed from a
set of traces that are generated by executing a probabilistic system. Fig. 6 shows the sampling distribution of the mutual
information estimate of the joint distribution in Fig. 1b in Section 1. The graph shows the frequency (on the y axis)
of the mutual information estimates (on the x axis) when performing the estimation 1000 times. In each estimation
we perform precise analysis on the component T and statistical analysis on S1 and S2 (with a sample size of 5000).
The graph is obtained from 1000 samples each of which is generated by combining precise analysis on a component
and statistical analysis on 2 components (using 5000 randomly generated traces). As shown in Fig. 6 the estimate after
the correction of bias by Theorem 4.1 is closer to the true value. The estimate is roughly between the lower and upper
bounds of the 95% confidence interval calculated using Theorem 4.2.
The interval size depends on the sample size in statistical analysis as shown in Fig. 8a. In Fig. 8a we illustrated
the relationships between the size of the confidence interval and the sample size in the statistical analysis. We used an
example with the randomly generated 10 × 10 channel matrix presented in Fig. 7 and the uniform prior. The graph
shows the frequency (on the y axis) of the corrected mutual information estimates (on the x axis) that are obtained by
estimating the mutual information value 1000, 5000 and 10000 times. When the sample size is k times larger then the
confidence interval is
√
k times narrower.
The interval size also depends on the amount of precise analysis as shown in Fig. 8b. If we perform precise analysis
on larger components, then the sampling distribution becomes more centered (with shorter tails) and the confidence
interval becomes narrower. For instance, in Fig. 8b we illustrated the relationships between the size of the confidence
interval and the amount of precise analysis. The graph shows the frequency (on the y axis) of the corrected mutual
information estimates (on the x axis) that are obtained by estimating the mutual information value 1000 times when
statistical analysis is applied to a 10× 2, 10× 5 and 10× 10 sub-matrix of the full 10× 10 matrix. Using statistical
analysis only on a smaller component (10 × 2 sub-matrix) yields a smaller confidence interval than using it on the
whole system (10× 10 matrix). More generally, if we perform precise analysis on larger components, then we have a
smaller confidence interval. This means that the hybrid approach produces better estimates than the state of the art in
statistical analysis. Due to the combination with precise analysis, the confidence interval estimated by our approach is
smaller than LeakWatch [CKN14] for the same sample size.
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Fig. 8. Smaller intervals when increasing the sample size or the ratio of precise analysis.
8.2. Shannon Leakage Benchmarks
We compare the performance of our hybrid method with fully precise/statistical analysis on Shannon leakage benchmarks.
Our implementations of precise and statistical analyses are variants of the state-of-the art tools QUAIL [BLTW13,
BLTW] and LeakWatch [CKN14, CKNb] respectively. All experiments are performed on an Intel i7-3720QM 2.6GHz
eight-core machine with 8GB of RAM running Fedora 21.
8.2.1. Random Walk
We analyze the random walk example presented in Section 7.1 for different values of number of steps MAX . We plot
the computation times and the errors in leakage values computed by the three different methods in the graphs presented
in Fig 10. These graph show again that the execution time of precise analysis grows exponentially to the number of
steps MAX , while HyLeak and fully randomized analysis do not require much time even for large values of MAX . In
the fully randomized analysis the error is always much larger than when using HyLeak.
8.2.2. Reservoir Sampling
1 const N; // number of elements
2 const K; // selection
3 secret array[N ] of int1 s;
4 observable array[K] of int1 r;
5 public int32 j := 0;
6 for i in [0, K-1] do r[i] := s[i] ;
7 for i in [K,N -1] do
8 j := random(0,i);
9 if j<K then r[j] := s[i];
10 end
Fig. 9: Reservoir sampling.
The reservoir sampling problem [Vit85] consists of selecting K elements ran-
domly from a pool of N > K elements. We quantify the information flow of the
commonly-used Algorithm R [Vit85], shown in Fig 9, for various values of N
and K = N/2. In the algorithm, the first K elements are chosen as the sample,
then each other element has a probability to replace one element in the sample.
We plot the computation times and the errors in leakage values computed by the
three different methods in the graphs presented in Fig 11. It shows that HyLeak
hybrid approach performs faster than the full simulation approach and gives
more precise results. Compared to the precise analysis, the hybrid approach run
faster when increasing the model’s complexity.
8.2.3. Multiple Lying Cryptographers Protocol
The lying cryptographers protocol is a variant of the dining cryptographer multiparty computation protocol [Cha88]
in which a randomly-chosen cryptographer declares the opposite of what they would normally declare, i.e. they lie
if they are not the payer, and do not lie if they are the payer. We consider three simultaneous lying cryptographers
implementation in which 8 cryptographers run the protocol on three separate overlapping tables A, B and C with 4
cryptographers each. Table A hosts cryptographers 1 to 4, Table B hosts cryptographers 3 to 6, and Table C hosts
cryptographers 5 to 8. The identity of the payer is the same in all tables.
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Fig. 10. Random walk experimental results.
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Fig. 11. Reservoir sampling experimental results.
1 constN :=4; // number of cryptographers at each table
2 constM :=8; // total number of cryptographers
/* these bits represent the coin tosses for the three tables */
3 public array [N ] of int1 coinA, coinB, coinC;
4 public int32 lies; // this is for the liar
/* these bits represent the bits declared by the three cryptographers at each table */
5 public array [N ] of int1 declA, declB, declC;
/* these are the outputs at each table */
6 observable int1 outputA := 0;
7 observable int1 outputB := 0;
8 observable int1 outputC := 0;
9 secret int32 h := [0,M ]; // the secret has M+1 possible values
10 lies := random(1,M ); for c in coinA do c := randombit(0.5);
11 for c in coinB do c:=randombit(0.5);
12 for c in coinC do c:=randombit(0.5);
13 for i in [0, N − 1] do
14 declA[i]:=coinA[i] xor coinA[(i+ 1)%N ];
15 if h == i+ 1 then declA[i]:= ! declA[i];
16 if lies == i+ 1 then declA[i]:= ! declA[i];
17 outputA := outputA xor declA[i];
18 declB[i]:=coinB[i] xor coinB[(i+ 1)%N ];
19 if h == i+ 3 then declB[i]:= ! declB[i];;
20 if lies==i+3 then declB[i]:= ! declB[i];;
21 outputB := outputB xor declB[i];
22 declC[i] := coinC[i] xor coinC[(i+ 1)%N ];
23 if h == i+ 5 then declC[i]:= ! declC[i];
24 if lies == i+ 5 then declC[i]:= ! declC[i];
25 outputC := outputC xor declC[i];
26 end
Fig. 12. Multiple lying cryptographers.
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Fig. 13. Shifting window experimental results.
The division into components is executed following the principles in Section 7.3. The hybrid approach divides the
protocol into 8 components, one for each possible liar. Then each component is analyzed statistically.
The results of the experiment are summarized in Table 3. Note that this example has some zeroes in the probabilities
in the channel matrix, which makes the tool LeakWatch [CKN14, CKNb] compute an incorrect result due to incorrect
bias estimation, as explained in Section 5.1. In fact, the leakage value obtained by LeakWatch using Corollary 5.1 is
0.36245, which is far from the correct value of 0.503 in Table 3. On the other hand, the error of our calculation using
Proposition 5.2 is 1.87e-4 even with fully statistical analysis.
8.2.4. Shifting Window
1 const N; // number of elements
2 const W; // window size
3 secret int32 sec := [0,N -1];
4 observable int32 obs;
5 public int32minS, sizeS, sizeS,minO,
sizeO;
6 minS := random(0,N -W -1);
7 if sec ≥ minS then
8 sizeS := random(1,W );
9 if sec ≤ minS+sizeS then
10 minO := random(0,N -W -1);
11 sizeO := random(1,W );
12 obs := random(minO,minO+sizeO);
13 else
14 obs := random(0,N -1);
15 end
16 else
17 obs := random(0,N -1);
18 end
Fig. 14: Shifting Window.
In the Shifting Window example (Fig. 14) the secret sec can take
N possible values, and an interval (called a “window”) in the secret
domain is randomly selected from 1 to W . If the value of the secret
is inside the window, then another window is randomly chosen in a
similar way and the program outputs a random value from this second
window. Otherwise, the program outputs a random value over the
secret domain.
In Fig. 13 we present the results of experiments on the shifting window
when increasing the size of the secret domain. The execution time
of precise analysis grows proportionally to the secret domain size N
while HyLeak and fully randomized analysis do not require much time
for a larger N . In the fully randomized analysis the error from the true
value grows rapidly while in using HyLeak the error is much smaller.
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8.2.5. Probabilistically Terminating Loop
1 constN ; // number of secrets
2 constBOUND;
3 secret int32 sec := [0, N ];
4 observable int32 obs;
5 public int32 time := 0;
6 public int2 terminate := 0;
7 public int32 rand;
8 while terminate 6= 1 do
9 rand := random(1,N );
10 if sec ≤ rand then terminate := 1;
11 time := time+1;
12 end
13 if time < BOUND then
14 obs := time;
15 else
16 obs :=BOUND;
17 end
Fig. 15: Probabilistically Terminating Loop.
The tool HyLeak can analyze programs that terminate only probabilis-
tically. For instance, the program shown in Fig. 15 has a loop that
terminates depending on the randomly generated value of the variable
rand. No previous work has presented an automatic measurement
of information leakage by probabilistic termination, as precise analy-
sis cannot handle non-terminating programs, which typically causes
non-termination of the analysis of the program. On the other hand, the
stochastic simulation of this program supported in HyLeak terminates
after some number of iterations in practice although it may take long
for some program executions to terminate.
We analyze this model with the hybrid and full simulation approaches
only, as the precise analysis does not terminate. The results are given
in Table 3. It shows that also with this problem the hybrid approach
performs faster than the full simulation approach.
8.2.6. Smart Grid Privacy
A smart grid is an energy network where users (like households) may consume or produce energy. In Fig. 16 we
describe a simple model of a smart grid using the HyLeak language. This example is taken from [BLQ15]. The users
periodically negotiate with a central aggregator in charge of balancing the total consumption among several users. In
practice each user declares to the aggregator its consumption plan. The aggregator sums up the consumptions of the
users and checks if it falls within admitted bounds. If not it answers to the users that the consumption is too low or too
high by a certain amount, such that they adapt their demand. This model raises some privacy issues as some attacker
can try to guess the consumption of a user, and for instance infer whether or not this particular user is at home.
In Fig. 17 we present the experiment results of this smart grid example for different numbers of users. HyLeak takes
less time than both fully precise analysis and fully randomized analysis (as shown in the left figure). Moreover, it is
closer to the true value than fully randomized analysis especially when the number of users is larger (as shown in the
right figure).
8.2.7. Benchmarks results
In Table 3 we show the results of all the benchmarks using fully precise, fully statistical and hybrid analyses, for a
sample size of 50000 executions. Timeout is set at 10 minutes.
The results in Table 3 show the superiority of our hybrid approach compared to the state of the art. The hybrid
analysis scales better than the precise analysis, since it does not need to analyze every trace of the system. Compared to
fully statistical analysis, our hybrid analysis exploits precise analysis on components of the system where statistical
estimation would be more expensive than precise analysis. This allows the hybrid analysis to focus the statistical
estimation on components of the system where it converges faster, thus obtaining a smaller confidence interval in a
shorter time.
9. Conclusions and Future Work
We have proposed a hybrid statistical estimation method for estimating mutual information by combining precise and
statistical analysis, and for compositionally computing the bias and accuracy of the estimate. This naturally extends to
the computation of Shannon entropy and conditional Shannon entropy, generalizing previous approaches on computing
mutual information. The method automatically decomposes a system into components and determines which type of
analysis is better for each component according to the components’ properties.
We have also introduced an algorithm to adaptively find the optimal sample sizes for different components in the
statistical analysis to minimize their variance and produce a more accurate estimate given a sample size. Moreover, we
have presented how to reduce sample sizes by using prior knowledge about systems, including the abstraction-then-
sampling technique with qualitative analysis. We have shown how to leverage this information on the system to reduce
the computation time and error of the estimation.
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1 constN :=9; // the total number of users
2 const S; // the number of users we care about
3 const C:=3; // the possible consumptions level
4 constM :=0; // the consumption level of the attacker
5 const LOWT :=2; // the lower threshold
6 constHIGHT :=9; // the upper threshold
/* the observable is the order given by the control system */
7 observable int32 order;
8 observable int1 ordersign;
/* the secret is the consumption of each user we care about */
9 secret array [S] of int32 secretconsumption := [0, C-1];
/* the other consumptions are just private */
10 private array [N -(S+1)] of int32 privateconsumption := [0,C-1];
11 public int32 total :=M ; // this is the projected consumption
/* count the secret consumptions */
12 for i in [0,S-1] do
13 for j in [0,C-1] do
14 if secretconsumption[i] == j then total := total + j;
15 end
16 end
/* count the private consumptions */
17 for i in [0,N -S-1] do
18 for j in [0,C-1] do
19 if privateconsumption[i] == j then total := total + j;
20 end
21 end
22 if total < LOWT then
23 order := LOWT − total;
24 ordersign := 0;
25 else if total > HIGHT then
26 order := total−HIGHT ;
27 ordersign := 1;
28 else
29 order := 0;
30 ordersign := 0;
31 end
Fig. 16. Smart Grid Example.
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Fig. 17. Smart grid experimental results.
We have provided an implementation in the freely available tool HyLeak. We have shown both theoretical and
experimental results to demonstrate that the proposed approach and implementation outperform the state of the art.
Future work includes developing theory and tools that extend our hybrid method to the analysis of other properties
and integrate further symbolic abstraction techniques into our estimation method. In particular, we are planning
to apply our approach to reasoning about uncertainty propagation in probabilistic programs (e.g., [BGP+16]) by
replacing concentration inequalities with our hybrid statistical estimation techniques. Another possible application of
the hybrid analysis is to compute information leakage among adaptive agents in the game-theoretic framework [ACKP17,
ACKP18], in which each agent probabilistically chooses a strategy that is modeled as a component of a channel.
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Precise Statistical Hybrid
Time(s) Leakage Error Time(s) Leakage Error Time(s) Leakage Error
R
an
do
m
w
al
k
N=2 0.467 2.17 0 3.85 2.19 1.15e-2 2.97 2.17 1.37e-4
N=3 0.748 2.17 0 4.51 2.19 1.74e-2 3.35 2.17 2.05e-4
N=4 1.93 2.17 0 5.34 2.2 2.42e-2 4.66 2.17 2.74e-4
N=5 5.25 2.14 0 5.4 2.17 3.03e-2 4.66 2.14 1.14e-4
N=6 21.2 2.11 0 6.05 2.14 3.35e-2 4.87 2.11 2.03e-4
N=7 122 2.07 0 6.14 2.12 4.58e-2 5.34 2.07 2.57e-4
R
es
er
vo
ir
N=4 0.134 0.732 0 3.84 0.734 2.33e-3 2.95 0.731 9.55e-4
N=6 0.645 0.918 0 7 0.926 7.47e-3 4.48 0.917 1.89e-3
N=8 8.8 1.1 0 10.1 1.14 4.41e-2 7.21 1.13 3.08e-2
N=10 timeout n/a n/a 15.7 1.62 n/a 11.1 1.61 n/a
N=12 timeout n/a n/a 27.7 3.02 n/a 20.7 3.01 n/a
Ly
in
g
cr
yp
to
.
397 0.503 0 106 0.503 1.87e-4 78.8 0.503 1.37e-6
Sh
if
tin
g
w
in
do
w N=20 1.97 1.51e-2 0 2.85 2.08e-2 5.65e-3 2.19 1.48e-2 3.31e-4N=24 3.24 1.46e-2 0 2.81 2.21e-2 7.58e-3 2.32 1.55e-2 9.16e-4
N=28 6.99 1.42e-2 0 2.91 2.33e-2 9.13e-3 2.83 1.35e-2 6.75e-4
N=32 12.4 1.38e-2 0 2.8 2.66e-2 1.28e-2 3.19 1.33e-2 5.93e-4
Pr
ob
ab
ili
st
ic
te
rm
in
at
io
n
N=5 n/a n/a n/a 4.14 0.424 n/a 2.76 0.432 n/a
N=7 n/a n/a n/a 4.13 0.455 n/a 3.08 0.454 n/a
N=9 n/a n/a n/a 4.43 0.472 n/a 3.71 0.473 n/a
Sm
ar
tg
ri
d S=1 57.5 8.49e-2 0 9.96 8.51e-2 2.31e-4 5.74 8.59e-2 9.43e-4S=2 82.9 0.181 0 16.8 0.188 6.82e-3 19.7 0.178 2.85e-3
S=3 99 0.293 0 14.2 0.332 3.9e-2 7.23 0.296 3.16e-3
S=4 106 0.425 0 18.2 0.585 0.16 8.16 0.455 3.06e-2
S=5 136 0.587 0 20.9 1.21 0.623 15.5 0.882 0.295
Table 3. Shannon leakage benchmark results using the three different methods (precise, full simulation and hybrid).
The results contain the time (in seconds) taken for the analysis, the value of the leakage (in bits), and the error (in
bits) compared to the true result, when the true result has been computed with the precise analysis. The result n/a
means either that the experiment cannot be performed on this example, which is the case for the precise analysis of the
probabilistic terminating loop, or that the error cannot be computed because the precise analysis was not successful.
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A. Proofs of Technical Results
In this section we present the detailed proofs of our results.
Hereafter we denote by Q the joint sub-distribution obtained by summing Qj’s:
Q[x, y]
def
=
∑
j ∈J
Qj [x, y] .
We write qxy to denote Q[x, y] for abbreviation. Then qxy is the probability that the execution of the system S yields
one of Tj’s and has input x and output y.
A.1. Proofs for the Mean Estimation Using the Abstraction-Then-Sampling
In this section we present the proof for Theorem 5.6 in Section 5.2, i.e., the result on mean estimation using the
abstraction-then-sampling. To show the theorem we present and prove Propositions A.1, A.2, and A.3 below.
First, recall that D is defined as the set of pairs consisting of inputs and outputs that appear with non-zero
probabilities in the execution of the whole system S:
D = {(x, y) ∈ X × Y : PXY [x, y] > 0}.
Recall also that I = {1, 2, . . . ,m}. Let I? = {1, 2, . . . ,m′} for m′ ≤ m.
Proposition A.1 (Mean of joint entropy estimated using the abstraction-then-sampling). The expected value
E
[
HˆI?(X;Y )
]
of the estimated joint entropy is given by:
E
[
HˆI?(X,Y )
]
= H(X,Y )−
∑
i∈I\I?
θ2i
2ni
( ∑
(x,y)∈D
ϕixy
)
−
∑
i∈I?
θ2i
2ni
( ∑
(x,y)∈D
ψixy
)
+O(n−2i )
where ϕixy =
Di [x,y]−Di [x,y]2
PXY [x,y]
and ψixy
def
= Di [x,y]pii[x]−Di [x,y]
2
PXY [x,y]
.
Proof. We use notations that we have introduced in the previous proofs. For each i ∈ I , let Xi be the set of the elements
of X that appear with non-zero probabilities in the component Si.
As explained in Section 5.2 we apply the standard sampling technique (shown in Section 4) to the components Si
with i ∈ I \ I?, and the abstraction-then-sampling technique to the components Si with i ∈ I?. We briefly recall the
two techniques below.
Using the standard sampling technique we compute the empirical sub-distribution Rˆi for Si with i ∈ I \ I? as
follows. The analyst first runs Si a certain number ni of times to obtain the set of execution traces. Let Kixy be the
number of traces that have input x ∈ X and output y ∈ Y . Then ni =
∑
x∈X ,y∈Y Kixy. From these numbers Kixy of
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traces we compute the empirical joint (full) distribution Dˆi of X and Y by:
Dˆi [x, y]
def
=
Kixy
ni
.
Since Si is executed with probability θi, the sub-distribution Rˆi is given by Rˆi[x, y]
def
= θiDˆi [x, y] =
θiKixy
ni
.
On the other hand, we use the abstraction-then-sampling sampling technique to compute the empirical sub-
distribution Rˆi for Si with i ∈ I? as follows. Recall that for each i ∈ I?, pii[x] is the probability of having an input x
in the component Si. For each i ∈ I? all the non-zero rows of Si’s channel matrix are the same conditional distribution;
i.e., for each x, x′ ∈ Xi and y ∈ Yi, PXY [x,y]pii[x] =
PXY [x
′,y]
pii[x′]
when pii[x] 6= 0 and pii[x′] 6= 0. Therefore it is sufficient
to estimate only one of the rows. We execute the component Si with an identical input x ∈ X ni times to record the
traces. Let Ki·y be the number of traces of the component Si that outputs y. Then we define the empirical joint (full)
distribution Dˆi of X and Y as:
Dˆi [x, y]
def
=
pii[x]Ki·y
ni
.
Since Si is executed with probability θi, the sub-distribution Rˆi is given by: Rˆi[x, y]
def
= θiDˆi [x, y] =
θipii[x]Ki·y
ni
.
Now the empirical joint probability distribution PˆXY is computed from the above empirical sub-distributions Rˆi
(obtained either by standard sampling or by abstraction-then-sampling) and the exact sub-distributions Qj (obtained by
precise analysis):
PˆXY [x, y] = qxy +
∑
i∈I\I?
θiKixy
ni
+
∑
i∈I?
θipii[x]Ki·y
ni
. (1)
LetKxy = (K1·y,K2·y, . . . ,Km′·y,K(m′+1)xy,K(m′+2)xy, . . . ,Kmxy), and fxy(Kxy) be the m-ary function:
fxy(Kxy) =
(
qxy +
∑
i∈I\I?
θiKixy
ni
+
∑
i∈I?
θipii[x]Ki·y
ni
)
log
(
qxy +
∑
i∈I\I?
θiKixy
ni
+
∑
i∈I?
θipii[x]Ki·y
ni
)
which equals PˆXY [x, y] log PˆXY [x, y]. Then the empirical joint entropy is:
HˆI?(X,Y ) = −
∑
(x,y)∈D
PˆXY [x, y] log PˆXY [x, y] = −
∑
(x,y)∈D
fxy(Kxy).
Let Kixy = E[Kixy] for each i ∈ I andKxy = E[Kxy]. Then Kixy = niDi [x, y] = niRi[x,y]θi , and Ki·y =
niDi [x,y]
pii[x]
=
niRi[x,y]
θipii[x]
. By the Taylor expansion of fxy(Kxy) (w.r.t. the multiple dependent variablesKxy) atKxy , we have:
fxy(Kxy) = fxy(Kxy) +
∑
i∈I\I?
∂fxy(Kxy)
∂Kixy
(Kixy −Kixy) +
∑
i∈I?
∂fxy(Kxy)
∂Ki·y
pii[x](Ki·y −Ki·y)
+
∑
i,j∈I\I?
1
2
∂2fxy(Kxy)
∂Kixy∂Kjxy
(Kixy −Kixy)(Kjxy −Kjxy) +
∑
i∈I\I?
j∈I?
1
2
∂2fxy(Kxy)
∂Kixy∂Kj·y
pij [x](Kixy −Kixy)(Kj·y −Kj·y)
+
∑
i,j∈I?
1
2
∂2fxy(Kxy)
∂Ki·y∂Kj·y
pii[x]pij [x](Ki·y −Ki·y)(Kj·y −Kj·y) +O(K3xy)
To compute the expected value E
[
HˆI?(X,Y )
]
of the estimated joint entropy, it should be noted that:
• E[Kixy −Kixy] = 0, which is immediate from Kixy = E[Kixy].
• E[Ki·y −Ki·y] = 0, which is immediate from Ki·y = E[Ki·y].
• If i 6= j then E[(Kixy −Kixy)(Kjxy −Kjxy)] = 0, because Kixy and Kjxy are independent.
• If i 6= j then E[(Kixy −Kixy)(Kj·y −Kj·y)] = 0, because Kixy and Kj·y are independent.
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• If i 6= j then E[(Ki·y −Ki·y)(Kj·y −Kj·y)] = 0, because Ki·y and Kj·y are independent.
• For each i ∈ I \ I?, (Kixy: (x, y) ∈ D) follows the multinomial distribution with the sample size ni and the
probabilities Di[x, y] for (x, y) ∈ D, therefore
E
[
(Kixy −Kixy)2
]
= V[Kixy] = niDi[x, y](1−Di[x, y]).
• For each i ∈ I?, (Ki·y: y ∈ Y+) follows the multinomial distribution with the sample size ni and the probabilities
Di[x,y]
pii[x]
for (x, y) ∈ D, therefore
E
[
(Ki·y −Ki·y)2
]
= V[Ki·y] = ni
Di[x, y]
pii[x]
(
1− Di[x, y]
pii[x]
)
.
Hence the expected value of fxy(Kxy) is given by:
E[fxy(Kxy)] = fxy(Kxy) +
∑
i∈I\I?
1
2
∂2fxy(Kxy)
∂K2ixy
E
[
(Kixy−Kixy)2
]
+
∑
i∈I?
pii[x]
2
2
∂2fxy(Kxy)
∂K2i·y
E
[
(Ki·y−Ki·y)2
]
+O(K3xy).
Therefore the expected value of HˆI?(X,Y ) is given by:
E
[
HˆI?(X,Y )
]
=H(X,Y )−
∑
(x,y)∈D
( ∑
i∈I\I?
1
2
θ2i
n2iPXY [x,y]
niDi[x, y] (1−Di[x, y])
+
∑
i∈I?
pii[x]
2
2
θ2i
n2iPXY [x,y]
ni
Di[x,y]
pii[x]
(
1− Di[x,y]pii[x]
)
+O(n−2i )
)
=H(X,Y )−
∑
i∈I\I?
θ2i
2ni
∑
(x,y)∈D
Di [x,y](1−Di [x,y])
PXY [x,y]
−
∑
i∈I?
θ2i
2ni
∑
(x,y)∈D
Di [x,y](pii[x]−Di [x,y])
PXY [x,y]
+
∑
i∈I
O(n−2i ).
Proposition A.2 (Mean of marginal output entropy estimated using the abstraction-then-sampling). The expected
value E
[
HˆI?(Y )
]
of the empirical output entropy is given by:
E
[
HˆI?(Y )
]
= H(Y )−
∑
i∈I
θ2i
2ni
(∑
y∈Y+
ϕiy
)
+O(n−2i ).
Proof. Recall that D is the set of pairs of inputs and outputs with non-zero probabilities, Dx = {y: (x, y) ∈ D} and
Dy = {x: (x, y) ∈ D}. For each i ∈ I \ I? and y ∈ Y let Li·y =
∑
x∈Dy Kixy . Recall the empirical joint distribution
PˆXY in Equation (1) in the proof of Proposition A.1.
Now the empirical marginal distribution PˆY on outputs is given by:
PˆY [y] =
∑
x∈Dy
PˆXY [x, y] =
∑
x∈Dy
(
qxy +
∑
i∈I\I?
θiKixy
ni
+
∑
i∈I?
θipii[x]Ki·y
ni
)
=
∑
x∈Dy
qxy +
∑
i∈I\I?
θiLi·y
ni
+
∑
i∈I?
θiKi·y
ni
.
LetKy = (L1·y, L2·y, . . . , Lm′·y,Km′+1·y,Km′+2·y, . . . ,Km·y), and fy(Ky) be the following m-ary function:
fy(Ky) =
( ∑
x∈Dy
qxy +
∑
i∈I\I?
θiLi·y
ni
+
∑
i∈I?
θiKi·y
ni
)
log
( ∑
x∈Dy
qxy +
∑
i∈I\I?
θiLi·y
ni
+
∑
i∈I?
θiKi·y
ni
)
,
which equals PˆY [y] log PˆY [y].
Let Y+ be the set of outputs with non-zero probabilities. Then the empirical marginal entropy is:
HˆI?(Y ) = −
∑
y∈Y+
PˆY [y] log PˆY [y] = −
∑
y∈Y+
fy(Ky).
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Let Li·y = E[Li·y] for each i ∈ I \ I?, andKy = E[Ky]. Then Li·y =
∑
x∈Dy Kixy. By the Taylor expansion of
fy(Ky) (w.r.t. the multiple dependent variablesKy) atKy , we have:
fy(Ky) = fy(Ky) +
∑
i∈I\I?
∂fy(Ky)
∂Li·y
(Li·y − Li·y) +
∑
i∈I?
∂fy(Ky)
∂Ki·y
(Ki·y −Ki·y)
+
∑
i,j∈I\I?
1
2
∂2fy(Ky)
∂Li·y∂Lj·y
(Li·y − Li·y)(Lj·y − Lj·y) +
∑
i∈I\I?
j∈I?
1
2
∂2fy(Ky)
∂Li·y∂Kj·y
(Li·y − Li·y)(Kj·y −Kj·y)
+
∑
i,j∈I?
1
2
∂2fy(Ky)
∂Ki·y∂Kj·y
(Ki·y −Ki·y)(Kj·y −Kj·y) +O(K3y )
Recall that DYi [y] =
∑
x∈X Di [x, y]. To compute the expected value E
[
HˆI?(Y )
]
of the estimated marginal
entropy, it should be noted that:
• E[Li·y − Li·y] = 0, which is immediate from Li·y = E[Li·y].
• E[Ki·y −Ki·y] = 0, which is immediate from Ki·y = E[Ki·y].
• If i 6= j then E[(Li·y − Li·y)(Lj·y − Lj·y)] = 0, because Li·y and Lj·y are independent.
• E[(Li·y − Li·y)(Kj·y −Kj·y)] = 0, because Li·y and Kj·y are independent.
• If i 6= j then E[(Ki·y −Ki·y)(Kj·y −Kj·y)] = 0, because Ki·y and Kj·y are independent.
• For i ∈ I \ I?, (Li·y: y ∈ Y+) follows the multinomial distribution with the sample size ni and the probabilities
DYi [y] for y ∈ Y+, therefore
E
[
(Li·y − Li·y)2
]
= V[Li·y] = niDYi [y] (1−DYi [y]) .
• For i ∈ I?, (Ki·y: y ∈ Y+) follows the multinomial distribution with the sample size ni and the probabilities
DYi [y] for y ∈ Y+, therefore
E
[
(Ki·y −Ki·y)2
]
= V[Ki·y] = niDYi [y] (1−DYi [y]) .
Hence the expected value of fy(Ky) is given by:
E[fy(Ky)] = fy(Ky) +
∑
i∈I\I?
1
2
∂2fy(Ky)
∂L2i·y
E
[
(Li·y − Li·y)2
]
+
∑
i∈I?
1
2
∂2fy(Ky)
∂K2i·y
E
[
(Ki·y −Ki·y)2
]
+O(K3y ).
Therefore the expected value of HˆI?(Y ) is given by:
E
[
HˆI?(Y )
]
= H(Y )−
∑
y∈Y+
( ∑
i∈I\I?
θ2i
2n2iPY [y]
E
[
(Li·y − Li·y)2
]
+
∑
i∈I?
θ2i
2n2iPY [y]
E
[
(Ki·y −Ki·y)2
]
+O(n−2i )
)
= H(Y )−
∑
i∈I
θ2i
2ni
∑
y∈Y+
DYi [y] (1−DYi [y])
PY [y]
+O(n−2i ).
Proposition A.3 (Mean of marginal input entropy estimated using the abstraction-then-sampling). The expected
value E
[
HˆI?(X)
]
of the empirical input entropy is given by:
E
[
HˆI?(X)
]
= H(X)−
∑
i∈I\I?
θ2i
2ni
(∑
x∈X+
ϕix
)
+O(n−2i ).
Proof. For the components i ∈ I?, the prior pii[x] is known to the analyst and used in the abstraction-then-sampling
technique. Hence these components produce no bias in estimating H(X). For the components i ∈ I \ I?, we derive
the bias in a similar way to the proof of Proposition A.2. Hence the theorem follows.
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Theorem 5.6 (Mean of mutual information estimated using the abstraction-then-sampling). The expected value
E
[
IˆI?(X;Y )
]
of the estimated mutual information is given by:
E
[
IˆI?(X;Y )
]
= I(X;Y ) +
∑
i∈I\I?
θ2i
2ni
(∑
(x,y)∈D
ϕixy −
∑
x∈X+
ϕix −
∑
y∈Y+
ϕiy
)
+
∑
i∈I?
θ2i
2ni
(∑
(x,y)∈D
ψixy −
∑
y∈Y+
ϕiy
)
+O(n−2i )
where ψixy
def
= Di [x,y]pii[x]−Di [x,y]
2
PXY [x,y]
.
Proof. By Propositions A.1, A.2, and A.3, we obtain the expected value of the estimated mutual information:
E
[
IˆI?(X;Y )
]
= E
[
HˆI?(X)
]
+ E
[
HˆI?(Y )
]
− E
[
HˆI?(X,Y )
]
= I(X;Y ) +
∑
i∈I\I?
θ2i
2ni
(∑
(x,y)∈D
Di [x,y]−Di [x,y]2
PXY [x,y]
−
∑
x∈X+
DXi [x]−DXi [x]2
PX [x]
−
∑
y∈Y+
DYi [y]−DYi [y]2
PY [y]
)
+
∑
i∈I?
θ2i
2ni
(∑
x∈Dx
Di [x,y]pii[x]−Di [x,y]2
PXY [x,y]
−
∑
y∈Y+
DYi [y]−DYi [y]2
PY [y]
)
+O(n−2i ).
Therefore we obtain the theorem.
A.2. Proofs for the Mean Estimation Using Only the Standard Sampling
In this section we present the proofs for Theorem 4.1 in Section 4.1 and Proposition 4.3 in Section 4.3.
Theorem 4.1 (Mean of estimated mutual information). The expected value E
[
Iˆ(X;Y )
]
of the estimated mutual
information is given by:
E
[
Iˆ(X;Y )
]
= I(X;Y ) +
∑
i∈I
θ2i
2ni
( ∑
(x,y)∈D
ϕixy −
∑
x∈X+
ϕix −
∑
y∈Y+
ϕiy
)
+O(n−2i )
where ϕixy =
Di [x,y]−Di [x,y]2
PXY [x,y]
, ϕix =
DXi [x]−DXi [x]2
PX [x]
and ϕiy =
DYi [y]−DYi [y]2
PY [y]
.
Proof. If I? = ∅, then E
[
Iˆ(X;Y )
]
= E
[
IˆI?(X;Y )
]
. Hence the claim follows from Theorem 5.6.
Proposition 4.3 (Mean of estimated Shannon entropy). The expected value E
[
Hˆ(X)
]
of the estimated Shannon
entropy is given by:
E
[
Hˆ(X)
]
= H(X)−
∑
i∈I
θ2i
2ni
∑
x∈X+
DXi [x] (1−DXi [x])
PX [x]
+O(n−2i ).
Proof. If I? = ∅, then E
[
Hˆ(X)
]
= E
[
HˆI?(X)
]
. Hence the claim follows from Proposition A.3.
A.3. Proof for the Variance Estimation Using the Abstraction-Then-Sampling
In this section we present the proof for Theorem 5.7 in Section 5.2, i.e., the result on variance estimation using the
abstraction-then-sampling.
To show the proofs we first calculate the covariances between random variables in Lemmas A.4, A.5, A.6, A.7,
and A.8 as follows. Recall that the covariance Cov [A,B] between two random variables A and B is defined by:
Cov [A,B]
def
= E[(A− E[A])(B − E[B])] .
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Lemma A.4 (Covariance between Kixy and Ki′x′y′). For any i, i′ ∈ I \ I?, Cov [Kixy,Ki′x′y′ ] is given by:
Cov [Kixy,Ki′x′y′ ] =

0 if i 6= i′
niDi [x, y](1−Di [x, y]) if i = i′, x = x′ and y = y′
−niDi [x, y]Di [x′, y′] otherwise.
Proof. Let i, i′ ∈ I \ I?. If i 6= i′ then Kixy and Ki′x′y′ are independent, hence their covariance is 0. Otherwise, the
theorem follows from that fact that for each i ∈ I \ I?, (Kixy: (x, y) ∈ D) follows the multinomial distribution with
the sample size ni and the probabilities Di[x, y] for (x, y) ∈ D.
Lemma A.5 (Covariance between Kixy and Li′·y′). For any i, i′ ∈ I \ I?, Cov [Kixy, Li′·y′ ] is given by:
Cov [Kixy, Li′·y′ ] =

0 if i 6= i′
niDi [x, y](1−DYi [y]) if i = i′, x = x′ and y = y′
−niDi [x, y]DYi [y′] otherwise.
Proof. Let i, i′ ∈ I \ I?. If i 6= i′ then Kixy and Li′·y′ are independent, hence their covariance is 0. Otherwise, the
covariance Cov [Kixy, Li·y′ ] is calculated as:
Cov [Kixy, Li·y′ ] = Cov
[
Kixy,
∑
x′∈Dy
Kix′y
]
=
∑
x′∈Dy
Cov [Kixy,Kix′y] .
Hence, when y = y′:
Cov [Kixy, Li·y′ ] = niDi [x, y](1−Di [x, y])−
∑
x′∈Dy\{x}
niDi [x, y]Di [x
′, y]
= niDi [x, y]−
∑
x′∈Dy
niDi [x, y]Di [x
′, y]
= niDi [x, y](1−DYi [y]).
When y 6= y′:
Cov [Kixy, Li·y′ ] = −
∑
x′∈Dy
niDi [x, y]Di [x
′, y] = −niDi [x, y]DYi [y].
Lemma A.6 (Covariance between Li·y and Li′·y′ ). For any i ∈ I \ I?, Cov [Li·y, Li·y′ ] is given by:
Cov [Li·y, Li′·y′ ] =

0 if i 6= i′
niDYi [y](1−DYi [y]) if i = i′, x = x′ and y = y′
−niDYi [y]DYi [y′] otherwise.
Proof. Let i, i′ ∈ I \ I?. If i 6= i′ then Li·y and Li′·y′ are independent, hence their covariance is 0. Otherwise, the
covariance is calculated as:
Cov [Li·y, Li·y] = Cov
[ ∑
x∈Dy
Kixy,
∑
x′∈Dy
Kix′y
]
=
∑
x∈Dy
∑
x′∈Dy
Cov [Kixy,Kix′y] .
Hence, when y = y′:
Cov [Li·y, Li·y] =
∑
x∈Dy
(
niDi [x, y](1−Di [x, y])−
∑
x′∈Dy\{x}
niDi [x, y]Di [x
′, y]
)
= niDYi [y](1−DYi [y]).
When y 6= y′:
Cov [Li·y, Li·y′ ] = −
∑
x∈Dy
∑
x′∈Dy′
niDi [x, y]Di [x
′, y′] = −niDYi [y]DYi [y′].
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Lemma A.7 (Covariance between Li·y and Ki′·y′). For any i ∈ I \ I? and any i′ ∈ I?, Cov [Li·y,Ki′·y′ ] = 0.
Proof. The claim is immediate from the fact that Li·y and Ki′·y′ are independent.
Lemma A.8 (Covariance between Ki·y and Ki′·y′ ). For any i, i′ ∈ I?, Cov [Ki·y,Ki′·y′ ] is given by:
Cov [Ki·y,Ki′·y′ ] =

0 if i 6= i′
niDYi [y](1−DYi [y]) if i = i′ and y = y′
−niDYi [y]DYi [y′] otherwise.
Proof. Let i, i′ ∈ I?. If i 6= i′ then Ki·y and Ki′·y′ are independent, hence their covariance is 0. Otherwise, the claim
follows from that fact that for each i ∈ I?, (Ki·y: y ∈ Y+i ) follows the multinomial distribution with the sample size ni
and the probabilities DYi [y] for y ∈ Y+i .
Theorem 5.7 (Variance of mutual information estimated using the abstraction-then-sampling). The variance
V
[
IˆI?(X;Y )
]
of the estimated mutual information is given by:
V
[
IˆI?(X;Y )
]
=
∑
i∈I\I?
θ2i
ni
( ∑
(x,y)∈D
Di [x, y]
(
1 + logPX [x]PY [y]PXY [x,y]
)2
−
( ∑
(x,y)∈D
Di [x, y]
(
1 + logPX [x]PY [y]PXY [x,y]
))2)
+
∑
i∈I?
θ2i
ni
( ∑
y∈Y+
DYi [y]γ
2
ixy −
( ∑
y∈Y+
DYi [y]γixy
)2)
+ O(n−2i )
where γixy
def
= logPY [y]−
∑
x∈X
pii[x] logPXY [x, y].
Proof. We first define Bixy and Bi·y by the following:
• Bixy def= ∂fxy(Kxy)∂Kixy = θini (1 + logPXY [x, y]).
• For each i ∈ I \ I?, Bi·y def= ∂fy(Ky)∂Li·y = θini (1 + logPY [y]).
• For each i ∈ I?, Bi·y def= ∂fy(Ky)∂Ki·y = θini (1 + logPY [y]).
Then the variance of HˆI?(X,Y ) is obtained from Lemmas A.4 and A.8 as follows:
V
[
HˆI?(X,Y )
]
= E
[
HˆI?(X,Y )2
]
−
(
E
[
HˆI?(X,Y )
])2
=
∑
i,i′∈I\I?
∑
(x,y)∈D
∑
(x′,y′)∈D
BixyBi′x′y′Cov [Kixy,Ki′x′y′ ]
+
∑
i,i′∈I?
∑
(x,y)∈D
∑
(x′,y′)∈D
pii[x]Bixypii′ [x
′]Bi′x′y′Cov [Ki·y,Ki′·y′ ] +O(n−2i )
=
∑
i∈I\I?
∑
(x,y)∈D
ni
(
B2ixyDi [x, y](1−Di [x, y])−
∑
(x′,y′)∈D\{(x,y)}
BixyBix′y′Di [x, y]Di [x
′, y′]
)
+
∑
i∈I?
∑
(x,y)∈D
ni
(
pii[x]
2B2ixyDYi [y](1−DYi [y])−
∑
(x′,y′)∈D\{(x,y)}
pii[x]pii[x
′]BixyBix′y′DYi [y]DYi [y′]
)
+O(n−2i )
=
∑
i∈I\I?
ni
∑
(x,y)∈D
Di [x, y]Bixy
(
Bixy −
∑
(x′,y′)∈D
Bix′y′Di [x
′, y′]
)
+
∑
i∈I?
ni
( ∑
y∈Y+
DYi [y]
(∑
x∈Dy
pii[x]
2B2ixy
)
−
( ∑
(x,y)∈D
DYi [y]pii[x]Bixy
)2)
+O(n−2i ).
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The variances of HˆI?(Y ) is obtained from Lemmas A.6 and A.8 as follows:
V
[
HˆI?(Y )
]
= E
[
HˆI?(Y )2
]
−
(
E
[
HˆI?(Y )
])2
=
∑
y,y′∈Y+
( ∑
i,i′∈I\I?
Bi·yBi′·y′Cov [Li·y, Li′·y′ ] +
∑
i,i′∈I?
Bi·yBi′·y′Cov [Ki·y,Ki′·y′ ]
)
+O(n−2i )
=
∑
i∈I
ni
∑
y∈Y+
DYi [y]Bi·y
(
Bi·y −
∑
y′∈Y+
Bi·y′DYi [y′]
)
+O(n−2i )
=
∑
i∈I\I?
ni
∑
(x,y)∈D
Di [x, y]Bi·y
(
Bi·y −
∑
(x′,y′)∈D
Biy′Di [x
′, y′]
)
+
∑
i∈I?
ni
∑
y∈Y+
DYi [y]Bi·y
(
Bi·y −
∑
y′∈Y+
Bi·y′DYi [y′]
)
+O(n−2i ).
Similarly, for Bix· = θini
(
1 + logPX [x]
)
, the variance of HˆI?(X) is given by:
V
[
HˆI?(X)
]
=
∑
i∈I\I?
ni
∑
(x,y)∈D
Di [x, y]Bix·
(
Bix· −
∑
(x′,y′)∈D
Bix′·Di [x′, y′]
)
+O(n−2i ),
which is symmetric to V
[
HˆI?(Y )
]
only w.r.t. I \ I? 6.
The covariance between HˆI?(X,Y ) and HˆI?(Y ) is obtained from Lemmas A.5 and A.8 as follows:
Cov
[
HˆI?(Y ), HˆI?(X,Y )
]
=
∑
i∈I\I?
∑
(x,y)∈D
∑
y′∈Y+
BixyBi·y′Cov [Kixy, Li·y′ ]
+
∑
i∈I?
∑
(x,y)∈D
∑
y′∈Y+
pii[x]BixyBi·y′Cov [Ki·y,Ki·y′ ] +O(n−2i )
=
∑
i∈I\I?
ni
∑
(x,y)∈D
Di [x, y]Bixy
(
Bi·y −
∑
(x′,y′)∈D
Bi·y′Di [x′, y′]
)
+
∑
i∈I?
ni
∑
(x,y)∈D
DYi [y]pii[x]Bixy
(
Bi·y −
∑
y′∈Y+
Bi·y′DYi [y′]
)
+O(n−2i )
Similarly, the covariance between HˆI?(X,Y ) and HˆI?(X) is given by:
Cov
[
HˆI?(X), HˆI?(X,Y )
]
=
∑
i∈I\I?
ni
∑
(x,y)∈D
Di [x, y]Bixy
(
Bix· −
∑
(x′,y′)∈D
Bix′·Di [x′, y′]
)
+O(n−2i )
The covariance between HˆI?(X) and HˆI?(Y ) is given by:
Cov
[
HˆI?(X), HˆI?(Y )
]
=
∑
i∈I\I?
ni
∑
(x,y)∈D
Di [x, y]Bix·
(
Bi·y −
∑
(x′,y′)∈D
Bi·y′Di [x′, y′]
)
+O(n−2i )
Therefore the variance of the mutual information is as follows:
V
[
IˆI?(X;Y )
]
= V
[
HˆI?(X) + HˆI?(Y )− HˆI?(X,Y )
]
= V
[
HˆI?(X)
]
+ V
[
HˆI?(Y )
]
+ V
[
HˆI?(X,Y )
]
+ 2Cov
[
HˆI?(X), HˆI?(Y )
]
− 2Cov
[
HˆI?(X), HˆI?(X,Y )
]
− 2Cov
[
HˆI?(Y ), HˆI?(X,Y )
]
6 Note that the abstraction-then-sampling relies on partial knowledge on the prior, i.e., the analyst knows pii[x] for all i ∈ I?, hence V
[
HˆI? (X)
]
has no term for I?. On the other hand, the standard sampling here does not use knowledge on the prior.
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=
∑
i∈I\I?
ni
∑
(x,y)∈D
Di [x, y](
Bix·
(
Bix· −
∑
(x′,y′)∈D
Bix′·Di [x′, y′]
)
+Bi·y
(
Bi·y −
∑
(x′,y′)∈D
Bi·y′Di [x′, y′]
)
+Bixy
(
Bixy −
∑
(x′,y′)∈D
Bix′y′Di [x
′, y′]
)
+ 2Bix·
(
Bi·y −
∑
(x′,y′)∈D
Bi·y′Di [x′, y′]
)
− 2Bixy
(
Bix· −
∑
(x′,y′)∈D
Bix′·Di [x′, y′]
)
− 2Bixy
(
Bi·y −
∑
(x′,y′)∈D
Bi·y′Di [x′, y′]
))
+
∑
i∈I?
ni
∑
y∈Y+
DYi [y]
(
Bi·y
(
Bi·y −
∑
y′∈Y+
Bi·y′DYi [y′]
)
+
∑
x∈Dy
pii[x]Bixy
∑
x′∈X+
pii[x
′]
(
Bix′y −
∑
y′∈Dx′
Bix′y′DYi [y
′]
)
− 2
∑
x∈Dy
pii[x]Bixy
(
Bi·y −
∑
y′∈Y+
Bi·y′DYi [y′]
))
+ O(n−2i )
=
∑
i∈I\I?
θ2i
ni
( ∑
(x,y)∈D
Di [x, y]
(
1 + logPX [x]PY [y]PXY [x,y]
)2
−
( ∑
(x,y)∈D
Di [x, y]
(
1 + logPX [x]PY [y]PXY [x,y]
))2)
+
∑
i∈I?
θ2i
ni
( ∑
y∈Y+
DYi [y]
(
logPY [y]−
∑
x∈X
pii[x] logPXY [x, y]
)2
−
( ∑
y∈Y+
DYi [y]
(
logPY [y]−
∑
x∈X
pii[x] logPXY [x, y]
))2)
+ O(n−2i )
A.4. Proof for the Variance Estimation Using Only the Standard Sampling
In this section we present the proofs for Theorem 4.2 in Section 4.2 and Proposition 4.4 in Section 4.3.
Theorem 4.2 (Variance of estimated mutual information). The variance V
[
Iˆ(X;Y )
]
of the estimated mutual in-
formation is given by:
V
[
Iˆ(X;Y )
]
=
∑
i∈I
θ2i
ni
( ∑
(x,y)∈D
Di [x, y]
(
1 + log PX [x]PY [y]PXY [x,y]
)2
−
( ∑
(x,y)∈D
Di [x, y]
(
1 + log PX [x]PY [y]PXY [x,y]
))2)
+O(n−2i ).
Proof. If I? = ∅, then E
[
Iˆ(X;Y )
]
= E
[
IˆI?(X;Y )
]
. Hence the claim follows from Theorem 5.7.
Proposition 4.4 (Variance of estimated Shannon entropy). The variance V
[
Hˆ(X)
]
of the estimated Shannon en-
tropy is given by:
V
[
Hˆ(X)
]
=
∑
i∈I
θ2i
ni
(∑
x∈X+
DXi [x]
(
1 + logPX [x]
)2
−
(∑
x∈X+
DXi [x]
(
1 + logPX [x]
))2)
+O(n−2i ).
Proof. Let I? = ∅ and Bix· = θini
(
1 + logPX [x]
)
. Then by the proof of Theorem 5.7 in Appendix A.3, we have:
V
[
HˆI?(X)
]
=
∑
i∈I
ni
∑
(x,y)∈D
Di [x, y]Bix·
(
Bix· −
∑
(x′,y′)∈D
Bix′·Di [x′, y′]
)
+O(n−2i )
Formal Aspects of Computing 39
=
∑
i∈I
ni
( ∑
(x,y)∈D
Di [x, y]B
2
ix· −
( ∑
(x,y)∈D
Di [x, y]Bix·
)2)
+O(n−2i )
=
∑
i∈I
θ2i
ni
(∑
x∈X+
DXi [x]
(
1 + logPX [x]
)2
−
(∑
x∈X+
DXi [x]
(
1 + logPX [x]
))2)
+O(n−2i ).
A.5. Proofs for Adaptive Analysis
In this section we present the proofs for the results in Section 6. To prove these it suffices to show the following
proposition:
Proposition A.9. Let v1, v2, . . . , vm be m positive real numbers. Let n, n1, n2, . . . , nm be (m + 1) positive real
numbers such that
∑m
i=1 ni = n. Then
m∑
i=1
vi
ni
≥ 1
n
(
m∑
i=1
√
vi
)2
.
The equality holds when ni =
√
vin∑m
j=1
√
vj
for all i = 1, 2, . . . ,m.
Proof. The proof is by induction on m. When m = 1 the equality holds trivially. When m = 2 it is sufficient to prove
v1
n1
+
v2
n2
≥
(√
v1 +
√
v2
)2
n1 + n2
. (2)
By n1, n2 > 0, this is equivalent to (n1 + n2)(n2v1 + n1v2) ≥ n1n2
(√
v1 +
√
v2
)2
. We obtain this by:
(n1 + n2)(n2v1 + n1v2)− n1n2 (√v1 +√v2)2 = (n1 + n2)n2v1 + (n1 + n2)n1v2 − n1n2 (v1 + 2√v1v2 + v2)
=n22v1 + n
2
1v2 − 2n1n2
√
v1v2
= (n2
√
v1 − n1√v2)2
≥ 0.
Next we prove the inductive step as follows.
m∑
i=1
vi
ni
=
(m−1∑
i=1
vi
ni
)
+
vm
nm
≥ 1
n1 + . . .+ nm−1
(∑m−1
i=1
√
vi
)2
+
√
vm
2
nm
(by induction hypothesis)
≥ 1
(n1 + . . .+ nm−1) + nm
(√(∑m−1
i=1
√
vi
)2
+
√
vm
)2
(by Equation (2))
=
1
n1 + . . .+ nm
(∑m−1
i=1
√
vi +
√
vm
)2
=
1
n
(∑m
i=1
√
vi
)2
.
Finally, when ni =
√
vin∑m
j=1
√
vj
for all i = 1, 2, . . . ,m, then
∑m
i=1
vi
ni
=
∑m
i=1
vi(
∑m
j=1
√
vj)√
vin
= 1n
(∑m
i=1
√
vi
)2
.
Theorem 6.4 (Optimal sample sizes using the abstraction-then-sampling). Let v?i be the following intermediate
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variance of the component Si:
v?i =

θ2i
( ∑
(x,y)∈D
Dˆi [x, y]
(
1 + log PˆX [x]PˆY [y]
PˆXY [x,y]
)2
−
( ∑
(x,y)∈D
Dˆi [x, y]
(
1 + log PˆX [x]PˆY [y]
PˆXY [x,y]
))2)
if i ∈ I \ I?
θ2i
( ∑
y∈Y+
DˆYi [y]γˆ
2
ixy −
( ∑
y∈Y+
DˆYi [y]γˆixy
)2)
if i ∈ I?
Given the total sample size n, the variance of the estimated mutual information is minimized if, for all i ∈ I and x ∈ X ,
the sample size ni is given by: ni =
√
v?i n∑m
j=1
√
v?j
.
Proof. By Proposition A.9 the variance v =
∑
i∈I
v?i
ni
of estimated mutual information is minimised when ni =√
v?i n∑m
j=1
√
v?j
. Hence the theorem follows.
Theorem 6.1 (Optimal sample sizes). Given the total sample size n and the above intermediate variance vi of the
component Si for each i ∈ I , the variance of the mutual information estimate is minimized if, for all i ∈ I , the sample
size ni for Si is given by: ni =
√
vin∑m
j=1
√
vj
.
Proof. Let I? = ∅. Then this theorem immediately follows from Theorem 6.4.
Proposition 6.2 (Optimal sample sizes for Shannon entropy estimation). Given the total sample size n and the
above intermediate variance v′i of the component Si for each i ∈ I, the variance of the Shannon entropy estimate is
minimized if, for all i ∈ I, the sample size ni for Si satisfies ni =
√
v′in∑m
j=1
√
v′j
.
Proof. By Proposition A.9 the variance v =
∑
i∈I
v′i
ni
of estimated Shannon entropy is minimised when ni =
√
v′in∑m
j=1
√
v′j
.
Hence the proposition follows.
Proposition 6.3 (Optimal sample sizes when knowing the prior). For each i ∈ I and x ∈ X , let vix be the follow-
ing intermediate variance of the component Six.
vix = θ
2
ix
(∑
y∈Dx
Dˆi [y|x]
(
log P̂Y [y]
P̂XY [x,y]
)2
−
(∑
y∈Dx
Dˆi [y|x]
(
log P̂Y [y]
P̂XY [x,y]
))2)
.
Given the total sample size n, the variance of the estimated mutual information is minimized if, for all i ∈ I and x ∈ X ,
the sample size ni and the importance prior λi satisfy: niλi[x] =
√
vixn∑m
j=1
√
vjx
.
Proof. By Proposition A.9 the variance v =
∑
i∈I
∑
x∈X+
vix
ni
of estimated mutual information is minimised when
niλi[x] =
√
vixn∑m
j=1
√
vjx
. Hence the theorem follows.
A.6. Proof for the Estimation Using the Knowledge of Priors
In this section we present the proof for Propositions 5.2 and 5.3 in Section 5.1.2, i.e., the result on variance estimation
using the knowledge of the prior.
Proposition 5.2 (Mean of mutual information estimated using the knowledge of the prior). The expected value
E
[
IˆΘ,Λ(X;Y )
]
of the estimated mutual information is given by:
E
[
IˆΘ,Λ(X;Y )
]
= I(X;Y ) +
∑
i∈I
1
2ni
∑
y∈Y+
(∑
x∈Dy
Mixy
PXY [x,y]
−
∑
x∈Dy Mixy
PY [y]
)
+O(n−2i ).
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Proof. Since the precise prior is provided to the analyst, we have
E
[
Iˆ(X;Y )
]
= E[H(X)] + E
[
Hˆ(Y )
]
− E
[
Hˆ(X,Y )
]
.
By using the results on E
[
Hˆ(Y )
]
and E
[
Hˆ(X,Y )
]
in the proof of Theorem 4.1, we obtain the proposition.
Proposition 5.3 (Variance of mutual information estimated using the knowledge of the prior). The variance
V
[
IˆΘ,Λ(X;Y )
]
of the estimated mutual information is given by:
V
[
IˆΘ,Λ(X;Y )
]
=
∑
i∈I
∑
x∈X+
θ2ix
niλi[x]
(∑
y∈Dx
Di[y|x]
(
log PY [y]PXY [x,y]
)2
−
(∑
y∈Dx
Di[y|x]
(
log PY [y]PXY [x,y]
))2)
+O(n−2i ).
Proof. Since the precise prior is provided to the analyst, we have
V
[
Iˆ(X;Y )
]
= V
[
H(X) + Hˆ(Y )− Hˆ(X,Y )
]
= V
[
Hˆ(Y )
]
+ V
[
Hˆ(X,Y )
]
− 2Cov
[
Hˆ(Y ), Hˆ(X,Y )
]
.
By using the results on V
[
Hˆ(Y )
]
, V
[
Hˆ(X,Y )
]
Cov
[
Hˆ(Y ), Hˆ(X,Y )
]
in the proof of Theorem 4.2, we obtain the
proposition.
